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Abstract
We develop a model to understand the impact of political risk on the investment
timing and size for firms. Considering political risk as being synonymous with
expropriation, we find that in a market where only one firm operates (monopoly),
expropriation risk does not affect the investment size, only affects the timing. For
the case of the monopolist it will make him invest sooner than normal.
When we look at a competitive setting we see that, making the assumption that
firms are symmetric and only invest if the government is not operating in the market,
the leader will tend to invest later with more quantity and the follower will invest
sooner with a lower commitment.
We also find that the government, in practice, sets a price ceiling that once hit,
makes it expropriate the firms in the market.
When we allow for the possibility for producing in the home country, we see that
firms will tend to produce in their home country if the amount of compensation is
bellow a compensation threshold for expropriation. If firms choose to produce in
their home country they will delay further the investment when compared to the
case for producing in the foreign country, and the market price will be higher com-
paratively.
Key Words: Real-Options, Option-Games, FDI, Expropriation
JEL-Codes: C73, D81, F21, G31, L13
ii
Suma´rio
Desenvolvemos um modelo para entender o impacto do risco pol´ıtico na tempo-
rizac¸a˜o e dimensa˜o do investimento das empresas. Considerando risco pol´ıtico como
sendo sinoˆnimo de expropriac¸a˜o, verificamos que num mercado onde uma u´nica firma
opera (monopo´lio), o risco de expropriac¸a˜o na˜o afeta o tamanho do investimento, so-
mente afeta a temporizac¸a˜o. No caso do monopolista verificamos que o fara´ investir
mais cedo do que o normal.
Quando olhamos para um cena´rio competitivo, assumindo que as empresas sa˜o
sime´tricas e somente investem se o governo na˜o estiver ativo no mercado, o l´ıder
tende a investir mais tarde e em maior quantidade e o seguidor ira´ investir mais
cedo com menor compromisso.
Tambe´m descobrimos que o governo, na pra´tica, estabelece um teto de prec¸os
que, uma vez atingido, o faz expropriar as empresas no mercado.
Quando permitimos a possibilidade de produzir no pa´ıs de origem, vemos que
as empresas tendera˜o a produzir no seu pa´ıs de origem se o valor da compensac¸a˜o
estiver abaixo de um valor threshold. Se as empresas optarem por produzir no seu
pa´ıs de origem, adiaram ainda mais o investimento em comparac¸a˜o com o caso de
produc¸a˜o no pa´ıs estrangeiro, e o prec¸o de mercado sera´ mais alto comparativamente.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When we turn on the TV, we seem to always ear a government representative talk
about attracting investment. The idea of having multinational enterprises (MNE’s)
investing in one’s country can be synonymous with growth, technological advances,
and knowledge spillover.
But when should firms invest in foreign countries? When is it optimal for MNE
to invest?
When MNEs decide to invest abroad, known as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
generally is so the firm can enter a new market (foreign-market-seeking FDI), to shift
production to a place that allows for lower overall costs (efficiency-seeking FDI) or
to a location where the necessary resources are available (resource-seeking FDI)
(Buckley et al., 2007).
One thing that all of these types of investments have in common is the uncer-
tainty concerning the outcomes. For example, a firm investing abroad with the goal
of obtaining a piece of the new market does not know exactly the evolution of the
market that will take place once the investment is made. The cost of service, the
demand and the growth of the host country market are some of the very impor-
tant considerations that MNEs have to take when doing FDI. (Buckley and Casson,
1981).
When planning to enter a new market, a firm also needs to take into account
potential competition. If a market is still to be explored, having an expectation
when competition will enter and the monopolistic rents will end, and conversely
when to enter a market when there is an incumbent firm, can alter the amount
that a firm is willing to supply to the market. Firms need to “account what they
think will be the other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions and realize
that their competitors think the same way” (Azevedo and Paxson, 2014). A market
might have growth potential but if it is already heavily populated no economical
profits will be found.
Another factor that MNEs take into account when investing is the political risk
in the host country (Jeanneret, 2016). A firm investing abroad in a country where
the local government has the propensity for investment expropriation, or even worse
for confiscation, may change the way investments are made. Such events can be
seen recently in Latin America where populist governments started a wave of na-
tionalizations.
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Political transparency and high reputational costs suffered from expropriation
by governments are an indirect insurance for a smooth investment. Of course not
every host country can be considered political safe or even transparent.
Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) in their study of policies/institutional
variables that affect FDI found that, with a sample of 22 Least Developed Coun-
tries (LDC’s), nationalization risk was significant in deterring FDI. These results
are comprehensive since it is expected that no company wants its investments na-
tionalized. Expropriation risk generally depends on the time horizon of political
regimes, as a sufficiently small time horizon will make the expropriation of an asset
more appreciable than the yield from taxes from that asset, and so governments will
be more willing to violate property and contract rights (Clague, Keefer, Knack, and
Olson, 1996).
Market entry also plays a role in a firm’s decision. The “how to do it” question
either throw exporting, wholly owned subsidiary, licensing or joint venture does play
a role when specific costs and technological requirements may favor some over others
(Buckley and Casson, 1998a).
The aim of this study is to primarily combine the market uncertainty and political
risk in the FDI context and give insights into how firms should go about when faced
with these unknowns.
This study, using the Real Option (RO) and Real Options Games theory (ROG)
will try to answer a simple question: In the FDI context, when is the optimal time
to invest when there exists competition and political risk?
Chapter 2 of this dissertation contains a literature review of the subject; in
Chapter 3 the base case is laid out and in Chapter 4 is extended to include the risk
of expropriation; Chapter 5 includes the possibility of producing in the home country
to then export to the foreign market and Chapter 6 gives the final conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Since the seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) on the theory
of option pricing, the literature on Real Options, a term introduced by Myers (1977)
to distinguish the opportunities (or options) to buy real assets, has been growing
at a rapid pace and aims to fill a gap that general theories do not account for, the
flexibility embedded in the decision making process. Myers (1977) was a pioneer in
transitioning the theory of options pricing to the corporate finance world. By using
the real options approach it is possible to value the flexibility that otherwise would
not be accounted for in the classic framework of capital budgeting (the Net Present
Value (NPV) approach is the case in point). As noted by McDonald and Siegel
(1986), investment timing is very important and not accounting for the existing
flexibility in a given project and just rely on traditional methods (NPV) can produce
suboptimal investments. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and subsequently Trigeorgis
(1996) provide useful and insightful textbooks for the theory and applications of
real options.
As Buckley and Casson (1998b) indicate, the static approaches still have a role
in helping to build more dynamic models that account for market uncertainty and
flexibility. New methodologies to model FDI nowadays have to take into considera-
tion a world that shifts and moves and bring static approaches to a more realistic
dynamic one.
2.1 Real Option’s Theory applied to FDI
Generally speaking, RO literature on FDI tends to focus on the optimal choice of
entry. For example, Capel (1992) focuses on the uncertainty of the market-servicing
costs and the possible adjustment costs when switching between servicing modes. He
found that uncertainty postpones switching even at certain levels where cost savings
are higher than switching costs. Furthermore, he also found that when uncertainty
is high it is optimal to choose a flexible market entry mode characterized by higher
production cost but lower adjustment costs because this mode can lead to lower
total costs, eventhou it carries higher production costs. On the same line of thought
Buckley and Casson (1998a) also found that lower level of commitment is preferred
when uncertainty is high.
The entry mode under uncertain profits, different tax rates between home and the
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host country, cost advantages, institutional requirements and degree of cooperation
in joint ventures will give different answers to what is the best way to enter a market
(Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2004).
Li and Rugman (2007) find that MNE’s are more inclined to invest in their
home country if they perceive that investing abroad does not generate additional
real options or when the real options in the foreign country are difficult to exercise.
Li and Rugman (2007) also find that when uncertainty is high, firms tend to make
low commitment investments (e.g. licensing) which is in line with previous studies.
2.2 Modeling competition with Option Games
Game theory can be traced back to 1838 in the well-known industrial organization
model of Cournot competition and alike. But the big stride has made by John Nash
in the 1950’s with the introduction of the more general theory of non-cooperative
games.
In the RO framework, early literature considered competition as being an exoge-
nous event (e.g. Baldwin, 1982).
ROG literature at the moment contains games that can be played as “one-shot”,
zero-sum, simultaneous/sequential or cooperative/non-cooperative and with per-
fect/imperfect, complete/incomplete, symmetric/asymmetric information. ROG ex-
tends the standard game theory by making the player’s payoffs evolve stochastically
instead of being static.
The present work is more interested in sequential, non-cooperative, with perfect
and symmetric information in a zero-some preemption game, for simplicity sake.
From the general RO theory we know that when a firm has a monopoly over
an investment decision, the firm also has an option to delay that invest and wait
for new information. In competition, where there are multiple firms with the same
investment opportunity, such value in waiting for new information is eroded by the
prospect of pre-emption (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).
It was shown by Reinganum (1981) that in a duopoly with identical firms and
perfect information, with the firms having a shared option, a Nash-equilibrium exists
where a sequential investment type game will occur rather than simultaneously. In
his paper, however, firms act “na¨ıvely”, not accounting for other firm’s actions,
reaching an open-loop equilibrium.
In contrast, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) considering closed-loop strategies that
allow for the consideration of previous actions, showed that when there is a first
mover advantage, rents (payoffs) are equalized, meaning that because of threat of
being preempted, and thus losing the first mover advantage, the decision to invest
will come at the first point where the option for leader and follower have the same
value and thus both are indifferent. In this setting, a firm will invest first preempting
the other, and the second one will invest when its “follower’s option” to invest is
maximized. Once the second firm invests the first mover advantage is diluted and
both share the market.
Grenadier (2002) derived a Cournot-Nash equilibrium model with a constant
elasticity inverse demand function with a multiplicative demand shock following a
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Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with symmetric firms producing one homo-
geneous good in an oligopolistic setting. He showed that competition drastically
erodes the cushion that a monopolistic firm can create before committing and that
investment in a competitive setting can lead to close to zero NPV investments.
Although the “cushion” may be reduced by the existence of competition, higher
levels of uncertainty can lead the entrant, second investor, to delay its investment
as it waits for more information, leaving a longer monopoly period for the leader
(Huisman and Kort, 2015). If, in a duopolistic setting, and products offered by the
symmetric firms are substitutes, the leader overinvests, coupled with uncertainty, it
will have the effect of delaying the entrant’s investment decision as it will invest less
and later, than if the leader didn’t overinvest, lengthening the monopolistic rents
for the leader (Huisman and Kort, 2015).
The first known literature combining RO with game theory was developed by
Smets (1993) in the context of FDI, extending the framework of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) by adding uncertainty in a duopoly setting where the two ex-ante
symmetric firms have a shared option to expand.
ROG’s can be seen throw R&D, patents, natural resources, technology adoption
and other areas in the literature 1, but, to the best of my knowledge, there seems to
not exist any other published literature regarding FDI that explores a competitive
setting with political risk included.
Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis (2011) book provides a well-structured liter-
ature review with extensions of the literature regarding ROG, but, as is the general
case for RO literature, the investment size is fixed, not accounting for the optimal
magnitude of investment for the given level of demand. Huisman and Kort (2015)
account for this issue, using a model that accounts for the optimal investment size.
2.3 Political risk
In this setup, it is considered that political risk is synonymous with expropriation
risk. As pointed out by Cole and English (1991), governments may expropriate
either for opportunistic or desperation reasons. Opportunistic reasons come when
consumption gains from expropriation make the utility gains from expropriation
the largest, or in other words governments expropriate given the high return on
capital. In turn, desperation actions come when the largest utility gain occurs when
consumption is low and the country marginal utility from expropriation is high.
A welfare maximizer government chooses to expropriate if the act of expropriation
increases current welfare.
MNE’s doing FDI are more exposed than firms only doing domestic investments
to foreign exchange risk and country risk (e.g. environmental, political) (Mahajan,
1990). Mahajan (1990), using the contingent claims analysis, prices expropriation
risk as an American non-dividend paying call option that an MNE writs to the host
country when it undertakes FDI. When the host country exercises such option it
pays the exercise price (i.e. compensation).
Using a different approach, Nordal (2001) used country risk indices as a stochastic
1For a review of literature see Azevedo and Paxson (2014)
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variable for a more general measure of country risk (e.g. economic, commercial,
political) making the connection between risk indices and the underlying investment
(oil in the case). The model is whoever dependent on the level of correlation between,
in the case, oil and the risk indices, and has pointed out by the author few estimated
correlation coefficients were found to be statically significant.
Clark (2003), extending the work of Mahajan (1990), introduced dividends, con-
tinuous exercise and models the firm’s position explicitly and, similarly to Clark
(1997), the cost of expropriation risk is treated as the value of an insurance policy
that pays off all losses resulting from expropriation. In it, the firm expropriation
risk is seen as a government trying to optimize its expropriation option. Similarly,
Schwartz and Trolle (2010) study expropriation in natural resources projects as a
government with the option to expropriate an oil field and thus receives all futures
profits losing the foregone taxes and/or royalties. In their paper, they extend the lit-
erature including other costs of expropriating, namely inefficient public management
and reputational costs. They postulate that the value of expropriation rises with the
spot price, futures slope curve and volatility and decreases the higher the corporate
tax and expropriation costs. Stroebel and van Benthem (2013) also postulate that
higher taxes lower the risk of expropriation.
Restrepo Ochoa, Correia, Pen˜a, and Poblacio´n (2015) extended the literature
by incorporating the effect of expropriation risk in the decision to abandon the
investment and delved deeper in the expropriation cost for the government and
for the overall economy with the given impact in the reputation. They formulate
indemnity and reputational costs as an endogenous problem (in Clark (2003) and
Schwartz and Trolle (2010) this problem is exogenous) by linking the reputational
costs to compensation for expropriation for a welfare maximizing government and
postulate that the welfare-maximizing government should “always offer the highest
possible compensation to the target firm to minimize welfare losses”. Restrepo
Ochoa et al. (2015) will serve as a guideline for the political risk problem in this
work.
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Chapter 3
Safe Environment
The main goal in this Chapter is to create a base case, without risk of expropri-
ation, that develops the basic ideas to then be extended in the following Chapter
to accommodate the risk of expropriation. The basic setup is a blend of the mar-
ket and optimal investment decision portion in Huisman and Kort (2015) with the
firms cost structure and tax scheme in Restrepo Ochoa et al. (2015). The setup and
ideas described in this Chapter will be transfer to the next Chapter to be built upon.
Similar to Huisman and Kort (2015), consider a new market where the price of
the output at time t is given by:
P (t) = X(t)(1− ηQ(t)) (3.1)
where Q(t) is the total market output, η > 0 is a constant and X(t) is a exogenous
shock process that follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM):
dX(t) = µX(t)dt+ σX(t)dw(t) (3.2)
where µ is the drift rate, r is the risk-free rate, σ is the standard deviation, and dw
is the increment of the Wiener process. It is assumed that r > µ in order to obtain
a solution.
To gain access to the cash flows available at a particular time t, denoted by:
pi (t) =
(
Q (t)P (t) (1− ρ)− cvQ (t)
)
(1− τ) (3.3)
where ρ is a royalty fee, τ is a corporate tax and cv are the costs of production per
unit of Q, firms must invest in installed capacity Q. The cost per unit of installed
capacity Q is given by δ, thereby the investment cost in installed capacity is given
by δQ.
The model we develop assumes that there is a government and private firms.
The value of the private firm is denoted by V and the value of the government by
G. In this Chapter, the government only has interests in the tax that it can collect
from the private firms, while the firms have interests in the cash-flows that can be
obtained from being in the market. The investment opportunity that firms hold, as
they are still waiting to invest, is denoted by the subscript 0.
Since we consider two scenarios, a safe one where the government commits to a
tax scheme and is not threatening with expropriation, and a risky one where the
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government is an opportunistic agent, and will expropriate if it benefits from the ex-
tra cash-flows from operating the business itself, the superscript i = {s, e}, is used to
identify each scenario, where s represents the safe scenario and e represents the one
with expropriation risk (the risky one for simplicity). Also, in order to distinguish
between the cash-flows that accrue to the private firms from being in the market,
the subscript j = {m, lm, ld, f} is used, representing the value for the monopolist,
leader in monopoly, leader in duopoly and follower, respectively. In the case of the
government the subscripts gm, glm , gld and gf are used, representing the cash-flows
accruing from the tax collected from the monopolist, the leader while monopolist,
the leader in a duopoly, and the follower, respectively.
The following assumptions are made in order to simplify the modeling problem:
Assumption 1. The government commits to a tax scheme that the firms must
comply with.
Under this assumption, the government sets a corporate tax, denoted by τ , and
also has the possibility of charging royalties, denoted by ρ, that the firm must com-
ply with. This tax scheme is known by firms at the beginning of the process.
Assumption 2. The firm has no outside opportunities.
Assumption 3. There are no informational asymmetries.
This assumption states that all information is available to all parts involved.
Under this assumption all parts involved can anticipate what others will do.
Assumption 4. Firms produce at full capacity
It is assumed that firms produce the quantity that they invested for, otherwise
firms could slow production to artificially inflate prices.
Following the framwork of Huisman and Kort (2015), the private firm invest-
ment problem is solved as an optimal stopping problem in dynamic programming,
formalized as:
V ij (X) = max
T>0,Qij>0
E

∞∫
t=T
piij (t) e
−rtdt− δQije−rT
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣X(0) = X
 (3.4)
where T is the time when the investment is made. The process is thought to start at
time 0. This assumption is made to ensure that the first observed t is inferior to the
actual investment moment, T . The level of X at which firms are indifferent between
investing and not investing is noted by X i∗j . For values of X < X
i∗
j firms do not
invest as they are still in the continuation region waiting for the market to develop.
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When X > X i∗j it is optimal to invest immediately since the process reaches the
stopping region. The optimal investment timing, T , is the first time the stochastic
process X reaches X i∗j . Since we are assuming that t < T , we have that the level of
X at the initial point is too low for the investment to be made, X < X i∗j .
To find the optimal quantity for any level of X we maximize the value of the
firm at moment of investment, with respect to Qij:
V ij (X) = max
Qij>0
E

∞∫
t=0
piij (t) e
−rtdt− δQij
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣X(0) = X
 (3.5)
from there is only a matter of incorporating the optimal quantity into the traditional
real options framework to solve the problem.
Note that any time formulation uses the general subscripts i or j, it symbolizes
that it will be carried out throughout the work and will be used in different contexts.
The proofs for all propositions are given in the Appendix.
3.1 Monopoly
Proposition 1. Investment option value for the safe Monopolist:
The cash flows accruing to a monopolist, at time t, are given by:
piim (t) =
(
Qim (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQim (t)
)
(1− ρ)− cvQim (t)
)
(1− τ) (3.6)
and the expected value of this cash flows at the moment of investment is given by:
Πim
(
X,Qim
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piim (t) e
−rtdt
 = (QimX(1− ηQim)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
i
m
r
)
(1−τ) (3.7)
The value of the safe monopolistic after investment, X ≥ Xs∗m , is:
V sm (X) = Π
s
m
(
X,Qs∗m
)− δQs∗m (3.8)
and its value before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xs∗m , is:
V0
s
m (X) =
(
Πsm
(
Xs∗m , Q
s∗
m
)− δQs∗m)( XXs∗m
)β1
(3.9)
where:
Xs∗m =
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cv (1− τ) + rδ)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (3.10)
is the investment trigger, and:
Qs∗m =
1
(β1 + 1) η
(3.11)
is the optimal capacity at the moment of investment, and:
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(3.12)
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The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P s∗m = X
s∗
m
(
1− ηQs∗m
)
(3.13)
Since the safe monopolist, once invested, will be indefinitely in the market, the
present value of the future cash flows are treated as the present value of a perpetuity
(3.7), accounting for the taxes collected by the government.
For values of X < Xs∗m , the safe monopolist will hold its investment and wait for
more information since the optimal time for investment, given by Xs∗m (3.10), is yet
to be reached, and so, its value is the value of the option to invest itself, denoted
by V0
s
m (X) (3.9). The first moment X reaches X
s∗
m the safe monopolist will invest
δQs∗m and receive Π
s
m(X,Q
s∗
m), and its value will be given by V
s
m (X) (3.8).
By substituting (3.10) and (3.11) into (3.1) we obtain the optimal price for
investment, P e∗m (3.13).
Note that the results are similar to the results of Huisman and Kort (2015) in
their monopolistic case. The optimal quantity at the moment of investment, Qs∗m
(3.11), is the same. So we have that taxes have no impact on the scale, but they do
affect the timing, Xs∗m (3.10). In this case they make the monopolist invest later.
Proposition 2. Value of the passive government in a monopolistic setting:
The cash flows accruing to the passive government, in a monopolistic setting, at
time t, are given by:
piigm (t) =
(
Qim (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQim(t)
))
ρ
+
(
Qim (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQim (t)
)
(1− ρ)− cvQim (t)
)
τ (3.14)
and the expected value of the cash flows at the moment the monopolist invests is
given by:
Πigm(X,Q
i
m) = E
 ∞∫
t=0
piigm(t)e
−rtdt

=
QimX(1− ηQim)
r − µ ρ+
(
QimX(1− ηQim)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
i
m
r
)
τ
(3.15)
The value of the passive government after the safe monopolist invests, X ≥ Xs∗m ,
is:
Gsm (X) = Π
s
gm
(
X,Qs∗M
)
(3.16)
and its value before the safe monopolist invests, X < Xs∗m , is:
G0
s
m (X) = Π
s
gm
(
Xs∗m , Q
s∗
m
)( X
Xs∗m
)β1
(3.17)
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Before the safe monopolist invests, X < Xs∗m , the government holds a claim,
noted by G0
s
m (3.17), on the safe monopolist’s option, that will be exercised once
the safe monopolist invests. The exercise of this option gives the government the
right to the tax proceeds from the tax scheme set by the government himself. Since
the safe monopolist will be in the market indefinitely, the value of the cash-flows
accruing to the government, from the tax collected, are considered as the present
value of a perpetuity (3.15). These cash-flows come from the percentage amount
collected by the royalty fee ρ and the corporate tax τ . After the safe monopolist
invests, when X ≥ Xs∗m , the value of the government, noted by Gsm (X) (3.16), is
the value those cash-flows.
3.2 Competitive
Following Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985 framework, the following competitive setting
consists of a leader and a follower, with symmetric cost structures. The leader is
the first firm to invests and the follower is the second one. Since there are no cost
advantages for either firm, a ”natural” leader will not emerge and it is unclear which
role each firm will have, and thus, firms will have the incentive to preempt its rival
in order to secure the monopolistic rents that will prevail while the follower still
waits for the optimal time to invest.
The following propositions take into account such actions.
Proposition 3. Investment option value for the safe follower:
The cash flows accruing to the follower, at time t, are given by,
piif (t) =
(
Qif (t)X(t)
(
1− η
(
Qil(t) +Q
i
f (t)
))(
1− ρ
)
− cvQif (t)
)(
1− τ
)
(3.18)
and the expected value of the cash flows at the moment the follower invests is given
by:
Πif
(
X,Qil, Q
i
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piif (t) e
−rtdt

=
QifX
(
1− η(Qil +Qif )
)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
i
f
r
 (1− τ)
(3.19)
The value of the safe follower after investment, X ≥ Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
, is given by:
V sf
(
X,Qsl
)
= Πsf
(
X,Qsl , Q
s∗
f
(
Qsl
))− δQs∗f (Qsl ) (3.20)
and its value before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
,
is:
V0
s
f
(
X,Qsl
)
=
(
Πsf
(
Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
, Qsl , Q
s∗
f
(
Qsl
))− δQs∗f (Qsl ))
(
X
Xs∗f (Q
s
l )
)β1
(3.21)
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where
Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
=
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cv (1− τ) + rδ)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− ηQsl )
(3.22)
is the investment trigger, conditional on the quantity choice by the leader, and
Qs∗f (Q
s
l ) =
1− ηQsl
(β1 + 1)η
(3.23)
is the optimal capacity at the moment of investment, conditional on the quantity
choice by the leader.
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P s∗f
(
Qsl
)
= Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)(
1− η
(
Qsl +Q
s∗
f (Q
s
l )
))
(3.24)
Similar to the case of the safe monopolist, after investing, the safe follower will
be in the market indefinitely, and so, the present value of the cash-flows accruing to
him is considered as a perpetuity (3.19).
For values of X < Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
, where Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
(3.22) is the optimal time to invest,
the value of the safe follower is the value of the investment option that it holds,
denoted by V0
s
f
(
X,Qsl
)
(3.21). The first moment X reaches the trigger Xs∗f , the
safe follower will invest δQs∗f
(
Qsl
)
and will receive Πsf
(
Xs∗f (Q
s
l ), Q
s
l , Q
s∗
f (Q
s
l )
)
. Its
value after investment is given by V sf
(
X,Qsl
)
(3.20).
In the case of the follower, since the leader has already invested, there are no
strategic actions that the follower can take to affect the leader’s decision. Because
this is the case, the follower will only take into consideration the leader’s installed
capacity and will adapt its optimal investment timing and capacity. The follower’s
optimal timing, Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
, and optimal capacity, Qs∗f
(
Qsl
)
, are both conditional on
the amount capacity invested by the leader.
The moment the follower enters the market, the leader will lose its monopolistic
rents and the market will become a duopoly, that may be shared in different propor-
tions, dependent on the difference in investment made by the leader and the follower.
Proposition 4. Investment option value for the safe leader:
The cash flows accruing to the leader, at time t, before the follower invests, are
given by:
piilm (t) =
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQil (t)
)
(1− ρ)− cvQil (t)
)
(1− τ) (3.25)
and after the follower invests are given by:
piild (t) =
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qil (t) +Q
i
f (t)
))
(1− ρ)− cvQil (t)
)
(1− τ) (3.26)
The expected value of the cash-flows at the moment the leader invests, knowing that
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the follower is yet to invest and is the next to enter the market, is given by:
Πilm
(
X,Qil
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piilm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T i∗f
(
piild (t)− piilm (t)
)
e−rtdt

=

QilX(1− ηQil)
r − µ −
(
X
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)
)β1
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)ηQ
i∗
f (Q
i
l)Q
i
l
r − µ
 (1− ρ)− cvQil
r
 (1− τ)
(3.27)
and after the follower invests, is given by:
Πild
(
X,Qil
)
= E

∞∫
t=T i∗f
piild (t) e
−rtdt
 =
QilX
(
1− η(Qil +Qif )
)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
i
l
r
 (1−τ)
(3.28)
The value of the safe leader after investing, and before the safe follower invests,
Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
> X ≥ Xs∗p , is:
V slm (X) = Π
s
lm
(
X,Qs∗l
)− δQs∗l (3.29)
and its value before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xs∗p <
Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
, is:
V0
s
l (X) =
(
Πslm
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)
− δQs∗l
)(
X
Xs∗p
)β1
(3.30)
where Xs∗p , the optimal time to invest under preemption, and Q
s∗
l , the optimal
capacity at the moment of investment, are numerically obtained by simultaneously
solving equations:
V slm
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)
= V0
s
f
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)
(3.31)
and
∂V slm
(
X,Qs∗l
)
∂Qs∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗p
= 0 (3.32)
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P s∗l = X
s∗
p
(
1− η
(
Qs∗l +Q
s∗
f (Q
s∗
l )
))
(3.33)
Because there is an advantage in being the leader, due to the monopolistic rents
that can be obtained by being alone in the market while is not optimal for the
follower to invest, there is an incentive to preempt the rival firm. By preempting,
firms strategically position themselves to gain from being alone in the market. Since
firms are symmetric, they will try to invest a little bit earlier than their competitor
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to get the monopolistic rents, and thus, if firm 1 wants to invest at X, firm 2 will try
to invest at X − ε, and firm 1 will respond by investing at X − 2ε, and this process
will continue, X − nε, until a point, we denote by the subscript p, is reached where
the values of being the leader or follower equal (V ilm = V0
i
f ), and there is no more
incentive to try and invest sooner than the rival. At this point, for the specific case
Xs∗p (obtained by (3.31)), firms are indifferent in being the leader or the follower,
and follows that at this point, with probability 1/2, one of the firms will invest and
will be the leader.
Since the follower will eventually enter the market, the present value of the
leader’s monopolistic rents need a correction for the difference in the value of being
a monopolist or being in a duopoly. This correction is obtained by the stochastic
factor
(
X
Xs∗f (Q
s∗
l )
)β1
in equation (3.27), that simply states that as the stochastic
variable X approaches Xs∗f , the value of the monopolistic rents tend to the value of
being a leader in a duopoly.
For values of Xs∗f > X ≥ Xs∗p , the value of the leader, given by V slm (X) (3.29),
is the value of the monopolistic rents corrected for the eventual entry of the fol-
lower in the market minus the investment costs, δQs∗l , and for for values of X < X
s∗
p
the value of the leader is the value of option that it holds, denoted by V0
s
l (X) (3.30).
Proposition 5. Value for the passive government in a competitive setting:
The cash flows accruing to the passive government, from the tax collect from the
leader, at time t, while the leader is a monopolist in the market, are given by:
piiglm (t) =
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQil(t)
))
ρ+
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQil (t)
)
(1− ρ)− cvQil (t)
)
τ
(3.34)
and after the follower invests, are given by:
piigld
(t) =
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qil(t) +Q
i
f (t)
)))
ρ
+
(
Qil (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qil(t) +Q
i
f (t)
))
(1− ρ)− cvQil (t)
)
τ (3.35)
The expected value of the cash flows at the moment the leader invests, and before
the follower invests, is given by:
Πiglm
(
X,Qil
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piiglm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T i∗f
(
piigld
(t)− piiglm (t)
)
e−rtdt

=
QilX(1− ηQil)
r − µ −
(
X
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)
)β1
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)ηQ
i∗
f (Q
i
l)Q
i
l
r − µ
 ρ
+

QilX(1− ηQil)
r − µ −
(
X
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)
)β1
Xi∗f (Q
i
l)ηQ
i∗
f (Q
i
l)Q
i
l
r − µ
 (1− ρ)− cvQil
r
 τ
(3.36)
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and the expected value of the cash flows, from tax collected from the leader, at the
moment the follower invests is given by:
Πigld
(
X,Qil
)
= E

∞∫
t=T i∗f
piigld
(t) e−rtdt

=
QilX
(
1− η(Qil +Qi∗f (Qil))
)
r − µ ρ+
QilX
(
1− η(Qil +Qi∗f (Qil))
)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
i
l
r
 τ
(3.37)
The value of the passive government, from the tax collected from the leader, in a
duopoly, X ≥ Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
, is given:
Gsld (X) = Π
s
gld
(
X,Qs∗l
)
(3.38)
and while the leader is a monopolist, Xs∗p ≥ X < Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
, is:
Gslm (X) = Π
s
glm
(
X,Qs∗l
)
(3.39)
Before the leader invests, X < Xs∗p , the value of the government is the value of the
claim that it holds on the leader’s option, noted by:
G0
s
l (X) = Π
s
glm
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)( X
Xs∗p
)β1
(3.40)
The cash flows accruing to the passive government, from the tax collected from
the follower, at time t, are given by:
piigf (t) =
(
Qif (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qil(t) +Q
i
f (t)
)))
ρ
+
(
Qif (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qil(t) +Q
i
f (t)
))
(1− ρ)− cvQif (t)
)
τ (3.41)
and the expected value of the cash flows, from the tax collected from the follower,
at the moment the follower invests is given by:
Πigf
(
X,Qil, Q
i
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piigf (t) e
−rtdt

=
QifX
(
1− η(Qil +Qif )
)
r − µ ρ+

QifX
(
1− η(Qil +Qif )
)
r − µ
 (1− ρ)− cvQif
r
 τ (3.42)
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The value of the passive government, from the tax collected from the follower,
after investment, X ≥ Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
, is given:
Gsf (X) = Π
s
gf
(
X,Qs∗l , Q
s∗
f (Q
s∗
l )
)
(3.43)
and before the follower invests, X < Xs∗f
(
Qs∗l
)
, the value of the government is the
value of the claim that it holds on the followers option, noted by:
G0
s
f (X) = Π
s
gf
(
Xs∗f (Q
s∗
l ), Q
s∗
l , Q
s∗
f (Q
s∗
l )
)( X
Xs∗f (Q
s∗
l )
)β1
(3.44)
1 The results for the passive government have a similar intuition to the case
of the private firms. The difference being that it does not have investment costs
and only collects the tax proceeds from the tax scheme in place. We have that the
present value of the cash-flows from the leader, similar to the safe leader’s case,
need a correction for values of X < Xs∗f (Q
s∗
l ) (3.36). After the follower enters the
market, X ≥ Xs∗f (Qs∗l ), the value of the government is the value of tax collected
from both firms in a duopoly, equation (3.38) for the leader and equation (3.43) for
the follower. Before either of them invest, X < Xs∗p < X
s∗
f (Q
s∗
l ), the government
holds a claim on the investment options of both, leader and follower. This claim
gives the government the right to the tax proceeds from the tax scheme.
3.3 Numerical Results
This section contains some numerical results that illustrate the propositions laid out
before.
The base-case parameter values are: r = 0.06, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.25, cv = 0.4,
δ = 20, η = 0.05, ρ = 0 and τ = 0.15
3.3.1 Monopoly
In the case of the investment trigger for the safe monopolist, Xs∗m , the results are
as expected. From Figure 3.1a, we can see that as volatility increases, the safe
monopolist will tend to invest later. This result simply indicates that, as the market
gets to be more volatile, firms will want a bigger ”buffer” to account for the larger
swings that may happen to their cash-flows. Also, in graph 3.1a, as expected,
higher values of the royalty fee ρ, and profits tax τ makes the monopolist invest
later, simply because for higher values, firm’s cash-flows would be less than what
would be desirable, so firms wait longer for the market to develop, in order to obtain
higher market prices to compensate for the loss from taxes. Because ρ is a direct
fee on revenues, it has a higher weight in delaying the firm’s investment than the
corporate tax τ .
1Note that total value for the government, that comes from the tax collected from the leader
and the follower, is the aggregate of the value that it gets from the tax collected from both. Since
this work is more interested in the firm’s perspective, this formulation only serves as the basis for
the next Chapter and the results will not be analyzed
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Figure 3.1: Sensitivity of Xs∗m to its variables, moved independently
In Figure 3.1b it’s possible to see that as the risk free rate, r, increases, the safe
monopolist will invest later, demanding higher prices, but in the case of the growth
rate, µ, is not so clear as we see a non-monotonic effect. For increasing values of
µ, further from r, the effect is to decrease the investment timing, but for increasing
values closer to the risk free rate the effect is to delay the investment.
In the case of the production costs, cv (3.1c), and investment costs, δ (3.1d), the
results simply show that as investment costs or production costs increase, the safe
monopolist will wait for better times in the market, symbolized by higher prices, to
compensate for the higher costs.
From equation (3.11) we can see that the installed capacity that the monopolist
is going to invest in is only affected by η and β1, which internally is affected by σ, µ
and r. This result is similar to the one obtained by Huisman and Kort (2015). From
Figure 3.2a we see that the safe monopolist will invest more as volatility increases in
the market. Since, as we saw before, for higher values of σ the safe monopolist will
invest later in a bigger market, the installed capacity also needs to account for the
bigger market that the firm wants to capture, and that’s what we see in Figure 3.2a.
Figure 3.2b shows that as r increases the installed capacity that the safe monopolist
is willing to invest diminishes. So we have that has r increases the safe monopolist
will invest later and with less capacity. In the case of the parameter µ, the quantity
to be installed increases, simply because the market has more potential for growth,
but the connection between investment timing and quantity is not so clear, since for
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity of Qs∗m to its variables, moved independently
increasing values of µ further from r the timing decreases and quantity increases, but
for increasing values of µ closer to r the timing increases but quantity still increases.
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity of the optimal price, P s∗m
Figure 3.3 shows the optimal price at which the safe monopolist will invest. The
investment price is obtained by simply substituting the trigger and optimal capacity
of the safe monopolist into equation (3.1). The movements in the optimal price
capture both the movements in the optimal timing and optimal capacity, and give
good intuition about the firm’s decision. We have that as the parameters σ, τ and ρ
increase, the safe monopolist will wait for higher prices (Figure 3.3a). In the case of µ
and r the results are inverse. For increasing values of µ the demanded price decreases,
while for r the demanded price increases (Figure 3.3b). The price movements for
different values of cv and δ are not shown as they have a straightforward intuition.
If we take into account that quantity is not affected by them, only the timing of
investment increases, we have that for higher of cv and δ the optimal price for
investment increases to compensate for the higher costs.
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3.3.2 Competitive
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity of Xs∗p /X
s∗
f to its variables, moved independently
From Figure’s 3.4a and 3.4b, we can see that for increasing values of σ, τ and ρ,
the optimal timing for the leader, Xs∗p , and the optimal timing for the follower, X
s∗
f ,
move similarly to the case of the safe monopolist (Figure 3.1a), and have the same
explanation as before.
In the case of µ, we have that as it increases, the leader will invest sooner (Figure
3.4c) which is the opposite of the follower which will invest later (Figure 3.4d). For
r we have that as it increases, the leader, similar to the safe monopolist, will invest
later, but the for case of the follower we have a non-monotonic effect. For increasing
values of r close to µ the follower will invest later, but for increasing values of r
further from µ will invest later. Bear in mind that the optimal time for the follower
depends on the quantity invested by the leader, and so when we look at the optimal
time to invest for the follower we have to consider the quantity invested by the
leader, which is talked about bellow.
Similar to Huisman and Kort (2015), we have that, for sufficiently small values
of µ, for increasing low values of σ the follower will invest more than the leader until
a cross point is reached where the leader will invest the same as the follower, and
after that point, the leader will invest more than the follower (Figure 3.5). But for
sufficiently large values of µ, as σ increases the leader will always invest more than
the follower.
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From Figure 3.6 we have that the amount that the leader and the follower will
invest as µ increases, also increases, with the only exception being for values close
to r for the follower, where a non-monotonic effect is seen. So we have that as µ
increases the leader will invest sooner but with more quantity, and the follower will
invest later but also with more quantity. In the case of the parameter r we have
that as it increases the leader will invest less, and so does the follower, but again,
in the case of the follower, for values close to µ the amount decreases.
Looking at the optimal investment prices for the leader and follower (Figure 3.7),
we can see that, in both cases, as σ, τ or ρ increase the optimal price to invest also
increases (Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7b). In regards to µ and r both leader and
follower have similar results. As µ increases the optimal price for both leader and
follower decreases, and as r increases the optimal price for both increases. Also by
comparing Figures 3.7b and 3.7d with Figures 3.3a and 3.3b of the monopolist we
can observe that the price at which the follower will invest is the same as the one
for the monopolist.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the market prices and market quantity for both the safe
monopolist setting and competitive setting. It provides a good overview of what was
pointed out previously. From Figure 3.8a we can observe that, for the same param-
eter values, the leader will invest sooner and at a lower price than the monopolist,
while the follower will invest later but at the same price as the monopolist. We can
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Figure 3.8: Market prices and quantity for the safe monopolist setting, P sm and Q
s
m,
and safe competitive setting, P sc and Q
s
c, for values of X
also see that the slope of the price decreases after the follower enters the market
as more quantity is being offered in the market, which is an expected result. From
Figure 3.8b we can see that at moment the follower invests, which is later than the
monopolist, the quantity supplied to the market will be higher than the case of the
monopolist, but before the follower invests the quantity supplied in the market is
actually lower than in the monopolist case.
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Chapter 4
Risky Environment
This Chapter expands on the previous one and introduces the risk of expropriation
that firms may face when they invest in a country. This may occur when governments
have the propensity to expropriate private firm’s investments if they get bigger
benefits from operating the business instead of just collecting the taxes.
In this Chapter, the subscript e is used to symbolize expropriation. Note that e is
used as a superscript and subscript, denoting risky environment and expropriation,
respectively. Also, the parameter k and cg are introduce. The parameter k is the
fraction of the value of the business, at the moment of expropriation, that the
government will compensate the private entity for the expropriation, and cg are the
costs of production of the government while operating the business.
For this Chapter some additional assumptions are made:
Assumption 5. The government is an opportunistic agent.
Under this assumption, following Restrepo Ochoa et al. (2015), expropriation by
the opportunistic government is a reaction to high real prices of a product or service.
It simply states that the government will expropriate if the price of a product or
service reaches a high enough level that is optimal for the government to expropriate.
Assumption 6. The government is less cost-efficient than a private firm.
There is a body of literature that suggests that the government is less efficient
than the private sector (e.g. Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Shleifer, 1998). A
justification generally used is that when an enterprise is run by political institutions
there is the possibility that its resources will be used to forward political ideologies,
negating its efficiency (Shleifer, 1998);
Assumption 7. Firms do not invest if the government is in the market.
When the government is in the market it produces doubts about its intentions
that can deter private firms from investing. Also, government enterprises have unfair
advantages such as easier assess to credit, exception from bankruptcy, tax exemp-
tions, direct subsidies to name a few.
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4.1 Monopoly
Proposition 6. Governments option to expropriate the risky monopolist:
The cash flows accruing to the active government operating the monopolist’s
business, at time t, are given by:
piem (t) = Q
e
m (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQem (t)
)− cgQem (t) (4.1)
The expected value of the cash flows, from operating the monopolist’s business, at
the moment the active government expropriates the business from the monopolist, is
given by:
Πem
(
X,Qem
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piem (t) e
−rtdt
 = QemX(1− ηQem)
r − µ −
cgQ
e
m
r
(4.2)
The value of the government at the moment of expropriation, X = X∗em(Q
e
m), is
given by:
Gem
(
Qem
)
= Πem
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
)− kΠem (X∗em(Qem), Qem) (4.3)
where k ∈ [0, 1], is the fraction of the value of the monopolist’s cash-flows by which
the government will compensate the monopolist for the expropriation.
The value of the government after the risky monopolist invests, and before ex-
propriation, X∗em(Q
e
m) > X ≥ Xe∗m , is given by:
Gem
(
X,Qem
)
= Πegm
(
X,Qem
)
+
(
Πem
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
)−Πegm (X∗em(Qem), Qem)
−kΠem
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
))( X
X∗em(Qem)
)β1
(4.4)
where the trigger for expropriation, X∗em, is given by:
X∗em
(
Qem
)
=
β1
(β1 − 1)
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k) (Qemη − 1)
(4.5)
and Xe∗m is investment trigger of the risky monopolist that is yet to be defined.
The optimal market price to expropriate the monopolist is given by:
P ∗em
(
Qem
)
= X∗em
(
Qem
) (
1− ηQem
)
(4.6)
At the moment of expropriation, the first time X reaches X∗em
(
Qem
)
, the value
of the government, noted by Gem
(
Qem
)
(4.3), is the value of the cash flows from
operating the business (4.2) subtracted by the amount of compensation given to
the risky monopolist. The government will loose Πegm
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
)
, the value
from the tax collected, pay kΠem
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
)
, the fraction amount of the value
of the monopolist, and receives Πem
(
X∗em(Q
e
m), Q
e
m
)
, the value of the cash-flows
from operating the business. The compensation is calculated as being a fraction
of the value of the business operated by the risky monopolist at the moment of
expropriation. k is an exogenous value, that is considered to be known at the
beginning of the process. This value can be thought to be the traditional amount
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of the fraction of the value of a business that an expropriating government tends to
pay as compensation for the expropriation.
After the risky monopolist invests, and before expropriation, X∗em(Q
e
m) > X ≥
Xe∗m , the value of the government is given by G
e
m(X,Q
e
m) (4.4). The first term is
the value of the taxes that the government collects from the monopolist, before
expropriation, and the terms in parenthesis represent the correction to the value of
cash-flows, that will occur once the government expropriates.
Because there is a period between the monopolist investing and the government
expropriating, X∗em(Q
e
m) > X ≥ Xe∗m , the stochastic discount factor
(
X
X∗em (Q
e
m)
)β1
in
(4.4) is used to correct the present value of the government for this period.
Proposition 7. Investment option value for the risky monopolist:
At the moment of expropriation, X = X∗em
(
Qe∗m
)
> Xe∗m , the monopolist loses its
business and receives a fraction (k) of the value of the business at expropriation. At
that moment, knowing that the investment has already occur, the value of the risky
monopolist is given by:
Vem = kΠ
e
m
(
X∗em(Q
e∗
m), Q
e∗
m
)− δQe∗m (4.7)
and the value of the risky monopolist after investment, and before expropriation,
X∗em
(
Qe∗m
)
> X ≥ Xe∗m , is given by:
V em (X) = Π
e
m
(
X,Qe∗m
)1−( X
X∗em(Qe∗m)
)β1−1
+ kΠem
(
X∗em(Q
e∗
m), Q
e∗
m
)( X
X∗em(Qe∗m)
)β1
− δQe∗m (4.8)
Before the risky monopolist invests, as it still holds the option to invest, X <
Xe∗m < X
∗
em
(
Qe∗m
)
, its value is given by:
V0
e
m (X) = V
e
m
(
Xe∗m
)( X
Xe∗m
)β1
(4.9)
where Xe∗m , the optimal time for investment, and Q
e∗
m , the optimal quantity at the
moment of investment, are numerically obtained by simultaneous solving the smooth
pasting condition (4.10) and capacity optimization condition (4.11):
∂V0
e
m(X,Q
e∗
m)
∂X
∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
=
∂V em(X,Q
e∗
m)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
(4.10)
∂V em(X,Q
e∗
m)
∂Qe∗m
∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
= 0 (4.11)
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P e∗m = X
e∗
m
(
1− ηQe∗m
)
(4.12)
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The value of the risky monopolist after investment, for values of moment X ≥
Xe∗m , is given by V
e
m (X) (4.8). To receive the present value of the cash-flows from
operating the business, Πem
(
X,Qe∗m
)
, the risky monopolist invests δQe∗m . Because
eventually the monopolist will be expropriated by the government, the value of the
cash-flows accruing to the risky monopolist, Πem
(
X,Qe∗m
)
, need a correction, as at the
moment of expropriation they will be worth zero to the firm. Basically we are talking
about a stream of cash-flows with expiration at the moment the stochastic process
reaches X∗em . The stochastic discount factor term
(
X
X∗em (Q
e∗
m )
)β−1
accounts for this
correction. AsX approachesX∗em
(
Qe∗m
)
, the first term in (4.8) will tend to zero. Sim-
ilarly, the compensation from the expropriation, kΠem
(
X∗em(Q
e∗
m), Q
e∗
m
)
is discounted
to the present by
(
X
X∗em (Q
e∗
m )
)β1
. At expropriation, the first time X reaches X∗em(Q
e∗
m),
the monopolist loses Πem
(
X∗em(Q
e∗
m), Q
e∗
m
)
and receives kΠem
(
X∗em(Q
e∗
m), Q
e∗
m
)
. Equa-
tion (4.7) represents the value of the risky monopolist at expropriation.
Before investing, the value of the risky monopolist, V0
e
m (X)(4.9), is the value of
the option to invest that the risky monopolist holds, that will be exercised the first
time X reaches Xe∗m . Once exercised the value of the risky monopolist will turn into
(4.8).
4.2 Competitive
Proposition 8. Governments option to expropriate the risky follower:
The cash flows accruing to the active government operating the follower’s busi-
ness, in a competitive setting, at time t, are given by:
pief (t) = Q
e
f (t)X(t)
(
1− η
(
Qel (t) +Q
e
f (t)
))
− cgQef (t) (4.13)
The expected value of the cash flows, from operating the follower’s business, at the
moment the active government expropriates the business from the follower, is given
by:
Πef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pief (t) e
−rtdt
 = QefX
(
1− η(Qel +Qef )
)
r − µ −
cgQ
e
f
r
(4.14)
The value of the government at the moment of expropriation, X = X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)
,
is given by:
Gef
(
Qel , Q
e
f ,
)
= Πef
(
X∗em(Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
− kΠef
(
X∗em(Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
(4.15)
and its value after the risky follower invests, before expropriation, as it still holds
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the option to expropriate, X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)
> X ≥ Xe∗f , is:
Gef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f ,
)
= Πegf
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
+
(
Πef
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
−Πegf
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
− kΠef
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
))( X
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f )
)β1
(4.16)
where
X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)
=
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k)
(
(Qel +Q
e
f )η − 1
) (4.17)
is the optimal time to expropriate the follower and Xe∗f , the investment trigger for
the risky follower, is yet to be defined.
The optimal market price to expropriate the follower is given by:
P ∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)
= X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)(
1− η(Qel , Qef )
)
(4.18)
The value of the active government after the risky follower invests and before
expropriation, X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ) > X ≥ Xe∗f , is given by Gef (X,Qel , Qef ) (4.16). The first
argument of the equation represents the value tax proceeds that the government
will collect. The terms in parenthesis represent correction that will take place to the
value of the cash-flows of the government once expropriation happens, at the first
time X reaches X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ). At X
∗
ef
(Qel , Q
e
f ) the government will exercise its option
to expropriate and will receive the value of the cash-flows from operating the fol-
lower’s business, Πef
(
X∗em(Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
, will pay the compensation to the risky
follower, kΠef
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
, and looses the value of the proceeds from the
tax collected from the follower, Πegf
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)
. The term
(
X
X∗ef (Q
e
l ,Q
e
f )
)β1
represents the stochastic discount factor that accounts for the correction. Its value
at expropriation is given by Gef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f )(4.15)
Proposition 9. Investment option value for the risky Follower:
The value of the risky follower at the moment the government expropriates him,
X = X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
> Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, is given by:
Vef
(
Qel
)
= kΠef
(
X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
, Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
− δQe∗f (Qel ) (4.19)
The value of the risky follower after investment, and before expropriation, X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
>
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X ≥ Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, is given by:
V ef
(
X,Qel
)
= Πef
(
X,Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)1−( X
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l ))
)β1−1
+ kΠef
(
X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
, Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)(
X
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l ))
)β1
− δQe∗f (Qel ) (4.20)
and before the risky follower invests, as it still holds the option to invest, X <
Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
< X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
)
, is given by:
V0
e
f
(
X,Qel
)
= V ef
(
Xe∗f (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)( X
Xe∗f (Q
e
l )
)β1
(4.21)
where Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, the optimal time to invest, and Qe∗f
(
Qel
)
, the optimal quantity
at the moment of investment, are numerically obtained by simultaneous solving the
smooth pasting condition (4.22) and capacity optimization condition (4.23):
∂V0
e
f (X,Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f )
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
=
∂V ef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f )
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
(4.22)
∂V ef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f )
∂Qe∗f
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
= 0 (4.23)
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P e∗f
(
Qel
)
= Xe∗f
(
Qel
)(
1− η
(
Qel +Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
))
(4.24)
Since the risky follower, after investing, will eventually be expropriated, its value
after investing, X ≥ Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, given by V ef
(
X,Qel
)
(4.20), much like in the case of
the risky monopolist, needs a correction in the value of the cash flows from operating
the business. The correction is obtained in the same way as in the case of the risky
monopolist, which means that the expected value from operating the business will
tend to zero, and the value of the compensation will tend to its nominal value as X
approaches X∗ef . At the moment of expropriation, the first time X reaches X
∗
ef
, the
value of the risky follower, given by Vef
(
Qel
)
(4.19), is the fraction k of the value of
the business that the government compensates the firm for the the expropriation.
Before investing, for values of X < Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, the value of the risky follower, given
by V0
e
f
(
X,Qel
)
(4.21) is the value of the investment option that it holds.
Proposition 10. Government’s option to expropriate the risky leader:
For values of X∗elm < X
e∗
f
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The cash flows accruing to the active government operating the leader’s business,
while the follower is yet to invest, at time t, are given by:
pielm (t) = Q
e
l (t)X (t)
(
1− ηQel (t)
)− cgQel (t) (4.25)
and the cash flows accruing to the active government operating the leader’s business,
after the follower invests, at time t, are given by:
pield (t) = Q
e
l (t)X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qel (t) +Q
e
f (t)
))
− cgQel (t) (4.26)
The expected value of the cash flows, from operating the leader’s business while
monopolist, at the moment the active government expropriates the business from the
leader, is given by:
Πelm
(
X,Qel
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pielm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T ∗f
(
pield (t)− pielm (t)
)
e−rtdt

=
QelX
(
1− ηQel
)
r − µ −
(
X
Xe∗f (Q
e
l )
)β1
Xe∗f (Q
e
l )ηQ
e∗
f (Q
e
l )Q
e
l
r − µ −
cgQ
e
l
r
(4.27)
The value of the government at the moment of expropriation, X = X∗elm (Q
e
l ), is
given by:
Gelm
(
Qel
)
= Πelm
(
X∗elm (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
− kΠelm
(
X∗elm (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
(4.28)
By solving the value matching condition (4.29) and numerically solving the smooth
pasting condition (4.30):
Gelm
(
X∗elm , Q
e
l
)
= Gelm
(
X∗elm , Q
e
l
)
(4.29)
∂Gelm
(
X,Qel
)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗elm
=
∂Gelm
(
X,Qel
)
∂X
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗elm
(4.30)
we get the trigger to expropriate the risky leader, while monopolist, X∗elm (Q
e
l ), and
the value for the government, after the risky leader invests, and before expropriation,
X∗elm
(
Qel
)
> X ≥ Xe∗p :
Gelm
(
X,Qel
)
= Πeglm
(
X,Qel
)
+
(
Πelm
(
X∗elm (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
−Πeglm
(
X∗elm (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
−kΠelm
(
X∗elm (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)) X
X∗e
lm
(Qel )
β1 (4.31)
where Xe∗p , the investment trigger for the risky leader, is yet to be define.
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For values of X∗elm > X
e∗
f
The expected value of the cash flows, from operating the leader’s business in a
duopoly, at the moment the active government expropriates the business from the
leader, is given by:
Πeld
(
X,Qel
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pield (t)e
−rtdt
 = QelX
(
1− η
(
Qel +Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
))
r − µ −
cgQ
e
l
r
(4.32)
The value of the government at the moment it expropriates the leader, already
in a duopoly, Xe∗p < X
e∗
f
(
Qel
)
< X = X∗eld
(
Qel
)
, is given by:
Geld
(
Qel
)
= Πeld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
− kΠeld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
(4.33)
and after the follower invests, before the expropriation of the risky leader, Xe∗p <
Xe∗f
(
Qel
) ≤ X < X∗eld (Qel ), is given by:
Geld
(
X,Qel
)
= Πegld
(
X,Qel
)
+
(
Πeld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
−Πegld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)
−kΠeld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)) X
X∗eld (Q
e
l )
β1 (4.34)
where the trigger to expropriate the leader in duopoly is given by:
X∗eld
(
Qel
)
=
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k)
(
(Qel +Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l ))η − 1
) (4.35)
The optimal market price to expropriate the leader in a duopoly is given by:
P ∗eld
(
Qel
)
= X∗eld
(
Qel
)(
1− η
(
Qel +Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l )
))
(4.36)
There are two cases that need to be analyzed in the case of government expro-
priating the leader.
The first case is for values of X∗elm ≤ X∗ef , where X∗elm denotes the trigger to
expropriate the leader while monopolist. In this range, the government will expro-
priate the leader before the follower enters the market since the government’s trigger
to expropriate the leader, X∗elm , is at a lower level than the investment trigger for
the follower, Xe∗f . By expropriating the leader, the government will receive the re-
maining value of the monopolistic rents that still exist, since the follower is yet to
invest at its optimal time, plus the value that will be generated from being in a
duopoly once the follower finally invests. Since this is the case, the expected value
of the cash-flows accruing to the government from operating the leader’s business,
while being a monopolist in the market, given by Πelm
(
X,Qel
)
(4.27), need a nega-
tive correction in order to account for the arrival of the follower. The value of the
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government at the moment of expropriation, X = X∗elm
(
Qel
)
, given by Gelm
(
Qel
)
(4.28), is the value of these cash-flows subtracted by the fraction of the value that
the government will compensate the leader. Because the government knows that
eventually the follower will enter the market, the value that it attributes to the
leader’s business is the value already corrected for that fact, in this case denoted by
Πelm
(
X∗elm , Q
e
l
)
(3.27).
Before expropriating the leader, while monopolist, for values of X∗elm > X ≥
Xe∗p , where X
e∗
p will denote the optimal time to invest for the leader, the value
of the government, noted by Gelm
(
X,Qel
)
(4.31), its the present value of the tax
proceeds that it gets from the leader plus the option to expropriate the leader while
monopolist, the first term and second terms in equation (4.31), respectively. The
first moment X hits X∗elm , the government exercises its option. By doing that the
government loses the value of tax proceeds that it could have collected from the
leader and receives the value of the cash flows from operating the leader’s business.
The second case is for values of X∗elm > X
e∗
f . In this range, since the trigger to
expropriate the leader, while monopolist, is bigger than the follower’s investment
trigger. The follower will invest sooner than the optimal time for the government
to expropriate the leader, while alone in the market. Since that is the case, the
government will allow both firms to enter the market and will wait for the price
to rise enough so it can expropriate both firms at the same time to become the
monopolist in the market. Note that the trigger to expropriate the leader, while
in a duopoly, equation (4.35), and the trigger to expropriate the follower, equation
(4.17), are the same. Of course this only happens because we are assuming that
firms are symmetric, otherwise, the triggers to expropriate would deviate.
Proposition 11. Investment option value for the risky Leader:
For values of X∗elm < X
e∗
f
The value of the risky leader at the moment the government expropriates him,
Xe∗p < X = X
∗
elm
(
Qe∗l
)
, is given by:
Velm = kΠ
e
lm
(
X∗elm (Q
e∗
l ), Q
e∗
l
)
− δQe∗l (4.37)
The value of the risky leader after investment, and before being expropriated,
X∗elm
(
Qe∗l
)
> X ≥ Xe∗p , is given by:
V elm(X) = Π
e
m(X,Q
e∗
l )
1−( X
X∗elm (Q
e∗
l )
)β1−1
+ kΠelm(X
∗
elm
(Qe∗l ), Q
e∗
l )
(
X
X∗elm (Q
e∗
l )
)β1
− δQe∗l (4.38)
and before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xe∗p < X
∗
elm
(
Qel
)
,
is given by:
V0
e
l (X) = V
e
lm(X
e∗
p )
(
X
Xe∗p
)β1
(4.39)
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where Xe∗p and Q
e∗
l are numerically obtained by simultaneous solving equations:
V elm
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
= V0
e
f
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
(4.40)
and
∂V elm
(
X,Qe∗l
)
∂Qe∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗p
= 0 (4.41)
For values of X∗elm > X
e∗
f
The value of the risky leader at the moment the government expropriates him,
X = X∗eld
(
Qel
)
> Xe∗p , is given by:
Veld = kΠ
e
ld
(
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
, Qe∗l
)
− δQe∗l (4.42)
and its value after the risky follower invests, and before being expropriated, X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
>
X ≥ Xe∗f
(
Qe∗l
)
> Xe∗p
(
Qe∗l
)
, is given by:
V eld (X) = Π
e
ld
(
X,Qe∗l
)1−
 X
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
β1−1

+ kΠeld
(
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
, Qe∗l
) X
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
β1 − δQe∗l (4.43)
After investment, X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
> Xe∗f
(
Qe∗l
)
> X ≥ Xe∗p
(
Qe∗l
)
, before the follower
enters the market, its value is given by:
V elm (X) = Π
e
m
(
X,Qe∗l
)
+
Πeld (Xe∗f (Qe∗l ), Qe∗l )
1−
Xe∗f (Qe∗l )
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
β1−1

+ kΠeld
(
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
, Qe∗l
) Xe∗f (Qe∗l )
X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
β1 −Πem (Xe∗f (Qe∗l ), Qe∗l )

(
X
Xe∗f (Q
e∗
l )
)β1
− δQe∗l (4.44)
and before investment, X < Xe∗p
(
Qe∗l
)
< Xe∗f
(
Qe∗l
)
< X∗eld
(
Qe∗l
)
, as it still holds
the option to invest, is given by:
V0
e
l (X) = V
e
lm(X
e∗
p )
(
X
Xe∗p
)β1
(4.45)
where Xe∗p and Q
e∗
l are numerically obtained by simultaneous solving equations:
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V elm
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
= V0
e
f
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
(4.46)
and
∂V elm
(
X,Qe∗l
)
∂Qe∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗p
= 0 (4.47)
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P e∗l = X
e∗
p
(
1− ηQe∗l
)
(4.48)
Similar to the last case, the leader also has to consider the two situations men-
tioned in Proposition 10. For values of X∗elm < X
e∗
f , the leader knows that its
monopolist rents will not end because of the follower’s investment, but because the
government will expropriate him first. Under this circumstances the correction to
the value of the active leader, given by V elm (X) (4.38), takes into account, similar to
the case of the risky monopolist, that the cash-flows from operating the business, in
a monopoly, will eventually be worth nothing, as X approaches X∗elm . As mention
before, the value that the government attributes to the leader its the value of the
leader as a monopolist corrected for the eventual entrance of the follower in the
market. So, its value at expropriation, the first moment X hits X∗elm , given by Velm
(4.37), is the fraction of the corrected value of the monopolistic rents.
For the second case, X∗elm > X
e∗
f , the leader knows that after investment, the
follower will be the next to enter the market, the first moment X hits Xe∗f , and only
after the follower enters the market, the government might expropriate him. The
leader not only needs to incorporate in his value the value of the option held by
the follower but also has to incorporate the option of the government to expropriate
him. Back to front, the value of the leader at the moment of expropriation, given
by Veld (4.42), its the fraction of the value of the leader’s rents at that moment,
that the government compensates him for the expropriation. In this case, the rents
while in a duopoly since the follower has already invested. Before expropriation,
and after the follower invests, the value of the leader, given by V eld (X) (4.43), its
the present value of the cash-flows, from being in a duopoly, with expiration at the
moment the government expropriates plus the value of the compensation from being
expropriated. After the the leader invests, and before the follower invests, the value,
given by V elm (X) (4.44), its the value the of cash-flows from being a monopolist in
the market corrected by the follower’s option to invest, with the governments option
to expropriate embedded in it.
4.3 Numerical Results
The base-case parameter values are: r = 0.06, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.25, cv = 0.4, cg = 0.6,
δ = 20, η = 0.05, ρ = 0, τ = 0.15 and k = 0.85. For the competitive case k = 0.90 is
used in order to allow for both firms to enter the market before expropriation could
happen, otherwise, for lower values of k, the leader would be expropriated before
the follower enters the market.
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One important incite comes from the results in Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.1a we
can see that for values of k < 1, the optimal time to invest for the risky monopolist,
Xe∗m , is lower than the optimal to invest for the safe monopolist, X
s∗
m . This means
that the risky monopolist will invest sooner than the safe monopolist. Because the
monopolist knows that it will be expropriated once a threshold is reached, it will
try to invest sooner than normal so it can be in the market for longer before being
expropriated to capture more cash-flows. As the value of k increases, the trigger of
the risky monopolist converges to the safe case, until the point k = 1 where they
become the same. At the point k = 1 the risky case turns into the safe case and the
results in the subsection 3.3.1 of the Chapter 3 apply.
Point ”A” in Figure 4.1a, denotes the level of k for which the trigger for ex-
propriation X∗em equals the investment trigger for the risky monopolist X
e∗
m . This
point is the last value k where the risky monopolist will not invest since it would be
immediately expropriated. For values of Xe∗m ≤ X∗em the risky monopolist will not
invest, otherwise it will.
Figure 4.1b has an interesting result, as it shows that the optimal installed
capacity that a firm investing in a country where there is a risk of expropriation is
the same as if it was investing in a safe country. In other words, political risk seems
not to influence the level of investment of a monopolist, but only its timing. So we
have that the monopolist will try to reduce the value of the business, to reduce its
”appeal” to the government, not by reducing its quantity but by investing sooner
at a lower market price.
Looking now at Figure 4.2, where the evolution of the price in this risky market
where only a monopolist exists, P em, is represented, we can see a better picture of
what is going on when the risky monopolist invests until the government expropri-
ates. At the moment the risky monopolist invests, the initial price in the market
is equal to the optimal trigger price to invest for the risky monopolist, P e∗m . As
time goes by (as X gets bigger), the price in the market rises until it hits a price
ceiling for the risky monopolist where it will be removed from the market. That
price ceiling is the trigger price for expropriation for the government, P ∗em .
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity of P ∗em to its variables, moved independently
Let us look at the optimal price, P ∗em , at which the government will expropriate
the risky monopolist. Although we could look at the optimal time, X∗em , instead
of the optimal price, we have to bear in mind that the government, in the end, is
looking for the price that makes it optimal to give up the tax collected from the
monopolist to gain control of the cash-flows from operating the business. Also note
that the optimal time is linked to the optimal price, since as X grows, keeping the
market quantity constant, the price in the market also grows, and thus a mutual
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conclusion can be achieved.
From Figure 4.3a we can see that as the volatility parameter, σ, increases, the
price demanded for expropriation also increases. The explanation for this is similar
to what was already mentioned before. As volatility increases, agents want a bigger
buffer to compensate for the larger swings. Additionally, we can see that as the
amount of taxes collect increase, τ and ρ, governments will tend to wait for higher
prices in the market. Since the amount of taxes collected is larger, only higher prices
will compensate for the loss of those taxes from operating the business, and thus,
we can say that for higher amounts of taxes collected, governments will tend to wait
longer to expropriate. This result is similar to Restrepo Ochoa et al., 2015, the
difference being that in their paper they consider the optimal time and not the price
in the market.
With respect to µ and r, we see from Figure 4.3b, that as µ increases the gov-
ernment will tend to expropriate sooner at a lower price, since higher growth in
the market symbolizes potential for higher cash-flows that eventually compensate
the higher costs from operating the business that the government has in compar-
ison with the private sector. The parameter r, whoever, is the opposite of what
is expected when we are talking about a private firm. As r increases, the optimal
price to expropriate the risky monopolist decreases. One explanation can be that
the government gives less value to lower present values of the tax collected than to
lower present values from operating the business, and thus will expropriate sooner
at a lower price, since for higher values of r the present value of the operating costs
for the government, cg, decrease.
Figure 4.3c results show, as expected, that as the production costs of the gov-
ernment, cg, approach (diverge) the production costs of the private firm, cv, it will
tend to expropriate sooner (later) at a lower (higher) price. This comes from the
simple explanation that as the government’s efficiency of running the private firm
approaches the efficiency of the private sector, the government will have the incen-
tive to run the business himself and gain from the higher cash-flows. If, whoever,
the government is so inefficient that it is better off collecting taxes, it will simply
stay put and wait for higher prices that could compensate for the lack of efficiency.
In the case of the risky monopolist, because the intuition that we get by moving
each individual parameter of the optimal price or optimal time to invest, is identical,
to conserve space only the optimal price is shown (Figure 4.4). Beware that the
intuition walks the same way for both cases.
Figure 4.4 shows the sensitivity of the optimal price to invest of the risky mo-
nopolist to its variables. The results are similar to those of the safe case with similar
explanations. As σ, τ , ρ (Figure 4.4a), r (Figure 4.4b) and δ (Figure 4.4d) increase,
the price demanded to enter the market also increases. For increasing values of µ
(Figure 4.4b) the price decreases. The difference comes when we move the param-
eter for the costs of production of the private firm, cv, and of the government, cg
(Figure 4.4c). As the efficiency of production of the private firms, cv, approaches the
efficiency of the government cg, the trigger to invest for the risky monopolist starts
to flatten, tending to diminish, meaning that the risky monopolist will invest sooner
at a lower price, bearing in mind that we still need to ensure that Xe∗m < X
∗
em .
Figure 4.5 shows the values of compensation k, for different parameter values,
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity of P e∗m to its variables, moved independently
that make the investment trigger of the risky monopolist, Xe∗m , be equal to the trigger
to expropriate the risky monopolist, X∗em . In other words, is the biggest value of
k by which the government will still expropriate the monopolist immediately after
investment. For higher values the monopolist will invest, for lower values it will
not. In simple terms we have that for parameters where the trigger to invest Xe∗m
decreases (increases) faster than X∗em , the government will be required to pay less
(more) for the monopolist to invest.
From Figure 4.5a it is possible to see that as volatility, σ, increases, the gov-
ernment does not have to compensate as much the risky monopolist. This result
suggests that the monopolist’s trigger for investment increases slower than the trig-
ger for expropriation, for increasing values of σ.
The same cannot be said for the corporate tax, τ . As corporate tax increase, the
amount of compensation needed also increases even thou increases in corporate tax
tends to make the government expropriate later.
A different story can be seen if the parameter ρ, representing royalty’s, is moved.
It has no effect in the amount of compensation that the government must pay
to ensure investment. The explanation for this result comes from the nature of
royalty’s. Because they directly affect the ”real” sales price for the private firm, the
response by firms is to look at the market price with the correction in mind, so it
simply implies that firms will wait longer for the ”real” price to archive the desirable
goal, and the response of the expropriating government is also to wait longer since
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now, indirectly, it will have a bigger piece of the business. These two have the same
weight in each other response.
In Figure 4.5b we can see that as µ increases the government does not have to
compensate as much the risky monopolist in order for the monopolist to enter the
market. With respect to r the story is the opposite. Since for higher values of r,
the monopolist will tend to invest later but the government will tend to expropriate
sooner, the impact on the amount of compensation tends to be more dramatic than
for the other cases we have seen, and so we have that for increasing (decreasing)
values of r the compensation needed tends to increase (decrease) rapidly.
Figure 4.5c shows that as the operating efficiency of the monopolist and govern-
ment converge, the government must compensate the monopolist at a higher rate,
otherwise the monopolist will not have the confidence that it would not be expro-
priated immediately since the government could be sufficiently efficient to run the
business himself. By given a higher compensation the leader will feel more confident
to invest since now the government will have a higher expropriation cost that offsets
its hypothetical efficiency.
We also need to consider the amount of investment that the risky monopolist
may need to do. As the investment commitment increases, the risky monopolist will
ask for higher guarantees in order to commit to the investment. Figure 4.5d shows
that as the cost per unit of installed capacity, δ, increases, the risky monopolist will
ask for a higher compensation to offset the higher costs of investment. This result
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is expected since only the private firm faces investment costs, and so we have that δ
does not affect the trigger for expropriation. Its possible to deduce that investment-
intensive industry will be more prone to ask for bigger guarantees in order to invest
since they will have a higher δ.
4.3.2 Competitive
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From Figure 4.6 we can see that the first moment in which a market can be
formed happens to values of k higher than point ”A”, where ”A” is the first moment
when Xe∗f = X
∗
ef
. Note that point ”A” in Figure 4.6 is the same point ”A” in Figure
4.1a which means that the lower limit of compensation that makes a monopoly or
a duopoly exist is the same. For values of k lower than this point the follower
will not invest because the trigger for expropriation, X∗ef , is lower than the trigger
for investment Xe∗f . For values of A ≤ k ≤ B, where ”B” is the point where
the trigger to expropriate the leader is equal to the trigger of the follower to invest,
Xe∗f = X
∗
elm
, the leader will be expropriated before the follower invests, which means
that the follower, when it invests, will be competing with the government.
Because it is assumed that private firms will not invest in a market where there is
an operating government enterprise, first we need to set that a competitive market,
in a country where risk of expropriation exist, will only be formed if the follower
enters the market before the leader is expropriated, otherwise the follower would be
investing in a market where the government would be operating.
In Figure 4.6, the last point where the leader will be expropriated before the
follower invests is denoted by point ”B”, where Xe∗f = X
∗
elm
. So, for values of k
higher than point ”B” the follower will invest and a competitive setting populated
by private firms will exist. By making this assumption, we are also assuming that
for values of A < k ≤ B, the only market that will be formed is a monopolistic one,
since in this range the follower will not invest, otherwise it would be competing with
the government.
Since the trigger to expropriate the leader and the follower, after both invest, is
almost identical to the monopolist case, the only difference being the quantity in the
market, the movement to its variables is identical to monopolistic case (Figure 4.3),
albeit at a higher trigger. To conserve space see the explanation in the monopolistic
case.
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Given the base-case, if we move the variable k with respect to the investment
trigger for the risky leader, Xe∗p , and risky follower X
e∗
f , and comparing with the
safe case (Figure 4.7) we can conclude that the risky leader will invest sooner and
the follower will invest later than the respective safe case. Because the leader knows
that it will not be expropriated before the follower invests, it will tend to invest
later, and conversely, the follower will invest sooner because it knows that it will be
expropriated after it invests.
From Figure 4.7b we can see that the leader will invest in more installed capacity,
Qe∗l , than in the safe case, Q
s∗
l , and the risky follower it will invest less in installed
capacity, Qe∗f , when compared to its safe case, Q
s∗
f . This means that, given that the
government only expropriates the private firms after the follower enters the market,
the leader will tend to take a bigger share of the market when compared to the safe
case.
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ing for the expropriation price, P ∗el,f
Since, as we saw in Figure 4.6, the last point where the leader would be expropri-
ated was point ”B”, at around k = 89.53%, by choosing k = 90% for our base case,
we ensure, barely, that the follower will invest before the leader is expropriated. The
market picture is given by Figure 4.8. In it we can see that the market price ceiling,
that once hit will make the government expropriate, P ∗el,f , is high enough for the
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leader to invest as monopolist, Xe∗p , and for the follower to invest, at X
e∗
f , and turn
the market in to a duopoly. Point ”A” marks the moment when the price for ex-
propriation equals the market price in the risky competitive setting, P ∗el,f = P
e
c . At
this point, the government will expropriate both firms and becomes the monopolist
in the market.
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Figure 4.9 shows the full picture of the differences between the safe and risky
case. From Figure 4.9a we can see that the risky leader will invest later at a higher
market price, and the risky follower will invest sooner at a lower market price than
the respective safe cases. We also can take away from 4.9b that the risky market
will be deprived of the product/service for longer initially, but because the risky
follower invests sooner than in the safe case, the market supply will increase sooner
than in the safe case. We also can take away that for values where both scenarios
are in the same range of X, the market price and quantity of both scenarios do not
seem to be much different.
Figure 4.10 shows the sensitivity of P e∗l and P
e∗
f to their variables. If we look
at the Figures for P e∗f (Figure 4.10b, 4.10d and 4.10f) we can see that movement
in relation to the variables is virtually the same as for the risky monopolist (Figure
4.2) with similar intuition. For the risky leader, the intuition is similar to the safe
leader’s case, but we have to take into consideration that the risky leader has to
consider the costs of production of the government (Figure 4.10e). As the costs of
production of the government, cg, get close to the costs of production for the private
firm, cv, the risky leader will tend to invest at higher market prices. The variability
to the investment costs are not shown, but the intuition is straightforward, higher
investments costs make the leader or the follower invest later at a higher market
price. Because the amount of compensation that is being considered in the base-case,
k = 90%, is close to the limit amount for which a competitive market will emerge,
k = 89, 53%, the results in Figure 4.10 are only demonstrative of the variation of
the price triggers, since a small movement in some variables can make k = 90%
insufficient to ensure that the follower invest before the leader is expropriated.
Similar to the case of the risky monopolist, we want to know, for different pa-
rameters, the last value of k by which a competitive market will be formed. In this
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case values that make Xe∗f = X
∗
elm
. The results are given by Figure 4.11. In it,
we can see that the only difference in movement from the monopolistic case, Figure
4.5, come from σ and µ. The movement of the others are similar and with similar
intuition, albeit with higher values of k. Different from the risky monopolist case,
the investment trigger of the follower increases faster for increasing values of µ, σ
than the trigger to expropriate the leader while monopolist, which means that the
government has to increase its compensation to offset the difference.
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Chapter 5
Choice of Investment Place
This Chapter explores the possibility for firms to produce in their home country
to then export their product to the foreign market, instead of producing in the
country where they want to sell there product. This way firms are less exposed to
events in the foreign country, like expropriation, simply because there is no means
of production to be expropriated. Of course, there are other ways to diminish the
exposure like licensing or joint ventures, but for simplification only exporting is
studied.
Since, in theory, firms can mismatch were they invest, home or foreign, the
superscript n = {i, h} is used to encapsulate all the possibilities, where h indicates
investing in the home country, and i = {s, e}, as before, represents investing in a
safe/risky foreign country. In practice, because firms are symmetric, the best choice
for one is also the best choice for the other.
Because firms are exporting products to a foreign country, additional costs have
to be considered. In addition to the cost already mentioned, transportation cost,
denoted by γ, and a tariff tax, denoted by θ, are also added. Also to account for
the differences in the investment costs to produce and sell in the foreign country or
produce in the home country and then sell in the foreign country we note δf = δ and
δh as the investment costs per unit of Q for the foreign and home case, respectively.
We still need to consider that a firm exporting production to then sell it in
the foreign country needs to act in conformity with rules that regulate transactions
between firms under common ownership and that the rule of dealing at arm’s length
applies, since now we are considering that a firm, in practice, will have revenues in
the home country, in the form of exports, and revenues in the foreign country, in
the form of sales to the final consumer. The transfer price considered, denoted by
Ph:
Ph = (ch + γ) (1 + φ) (5.1)
is obtained by applying an exogenous markup percent value, denoted by φ, to the
costs of producing in the home country, denoted by ch, and the transportation costs.
This markup value is thought to be the normal markup applied in the industry for
transactions between firms.
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5.1 Producing in the the Home country
Proposition 12. Investment option value for the Monopolist producing in the home
country:
The cash flows accruing to the monopolist producing in the home country, at
time t, are given by:
pihm (t) = Q
h
m (t) (Ph − ch − γ) (1− τh)
+Qhm (t)
(
X (t)
(
1− ηQhm (t)
)
(1− ρ)− Ph(1 + θ)
)(
1− τf
)
(5.2)
and the expected value of the cash-flows at the moment of investment is given by:
Πhm
(
X,Qhm
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihm (t) e
−rtdt

= Qhm
Ph − ch − γ
r
(1− τh) +Qhm
(
X(1− ηQhm)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
Ph(1 + θ)
r
)(
1− τf
)
(5.3)
The value of the monopolist producing in the home country, after investing, X ≥
Xh∗m , is given by:
V hm (X) = Π
h
m
(
X,Qh∗m
)
− δhQh∗m (5.4)
and before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xh∗m , is:
V0
h
m (X) =
(
Πhm
(
Xh∗m , Q
h∗
m
)
− δhQh∗m
)(
X
Xh∗m
)β1
(5.5)
where
Xh∗m =
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)
(
ch + rδh + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
r(1− ρ)(1− τf ) (5.6)
is the optimal time to invest, and
Qh∗m =
1
(β1 + 1) η
(5.7)
is the optimal capacity at the moment of investment.
The optimal market price for investment is given by:
P h∗m = X
h∗
m
(
1− ηQh∗m
)
(5.8)
The present value of the cash-flows accruing to the monopolist, producing in its
home country, are treated as the present value of a perpetuity since it is assumed that
the government, because the monopolist is producing in his home country, does not
have the possibility to expropriate the business. The value of the cash-flows, given
by Πhm(X,Q
h
m) (5.3), account for the extra costs in comparison to the previous cases,
namely the addition of transportation costs, γ, the corporate tax that must be paid
44
in the home country, τh, and the tariff tax θ. In the home country, the corporate tax
is applied to the home profits that are calculated as being the transfer price deduced
from the production and transportation costs multiplied by the amount produced.
In the foreign country the corporate tax, noted by τf , is applied on the foreign profits
that are consider to be the percent of the reselling price (market price) left after the
royalty fee is applied, deduced of the costs of buying the product from the home
country, that may be subject to a tariff tax.
The value of the monopolist at the moment of investing, to produce in the home
country, the first time X hits Xh∗m , given by V
h
m (X) (5.4), its the value of the cash
flows from operating the business from the home country (equation 5.3) minus the
investment costs in installed capacity δhQ
h∗
m . Before investing, for values ofX < X
h∗
m ,
the value of the monopolist producing at home is the value of the option to invest
that it holds, denoted by V0
h
m (X) (5.5).
Proposition 13. Investment option value for the Follower producing in the home
country:
The cash flows accruing to the follower producing in the home country, at time
t, are given by:
pihf (t) = Q
h
f (t) (Ph − cv − γ) (1− τh)
+Qhf (t)
(
X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qnl (t) +Q
h
f (t)
))
(1− ρ)− Ph(1 + θ)
)(
1− τf
)
(5.9)
and the expected value of the cash-flows at the moment of investment is given by:
Πhf
(
X,Qnl , Q
h
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihf (t) e
−rtdt

= Qhf
Ph − ch − γ
r
(1− τh) +Qhf
X
(
1− η(Qnl +Qhf )
)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
Ph(1 + θ)
r
(1− τf)
(5.10)
The value of the follower producing in the home country after investing, X ≥
Xhf
(
Qnl
)
, is given by:
V hf
(
X,Qnl
)
= Πhf
(
X,Qnl , Q
h∗
f (Q
i
l)
)
− δhQh∗f (Qnl ) (5.11)
and before investing, as it still holds the option to invest, X < Xhf
(
Qnl
)
, is:
V0
h
f
(
X,Qnl
)
=
(
Πhf
(
Xh∗f (Q
n
l ), Q
n
l , Q
h∗
f (Q
n
l ),
)
− δhQh∗f (Qnl )
)(
X
Xh∗f (Q
n
l )
)β1
(5.12)
where
Xh∗f
(
Qnl
)
=
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)
(
ch + rδh + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
r(1− ρ)(1− τf )(1−Qnl )
(5.13)
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is the optimal time to invest, and
Qh∗f
(
Qnl
)
=
1− ηQnl
(β1 + 1)η
(5.14)
is the optimal capacity at the moment of investment.
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P h∗f
(
Qnl
)
= Xh∗f
(
Qnl
)(
1− η
(
Qnl +Q
h∗
f
(
Qnl
)))
(5.15)
The value of the follower, producing at home, after investing, given by V hf (X,Q
m
l )
(5.11), is the present value of the cash-flows that the follower gets from producing
at home and selling in the foreign country, noted by equation (5.10), minus the
initial investment cost δhQ
h∗
f (Q
n
l ). Before investing, for values of X < X
h∗
f (Q
n
l ), the
follower’s value, given by V0
h
f (X,Q
n
l ) (5.12), its equal to the investment option value
that it holds to produce in the home country.
Proposition 14. Investment option value for the Leader producing in the home
country:
The cash flows accruing to the leader producing in the home country, before the
follower invests, at time t, are given by:
pihlm (t) = Q
h
l (t) (Ph − ch − γ) (1− τh)
+Qhl (t)
(
X (t)
(
1− ηQhl (t)
)
(1− ρ)− Ph(1 + θ)
)(
1− τf
)
(5.16)
and after the follower invests are given by:
pihld (t) = Q
h
l (t) (Ph − ch − γ) (1− τh)
+Qhl (t)
(
X (t)
(
1− η
(
Qhl (t) +Q
n
f (t)
))
(1− ρ)− Ph(1 + θ)
)(
1− τf
)
(5.17)
The expected value of the cash-flows at the moment the leader producing in the
home country invests, and before the follower invests, is given by:
Πhlm
(
X,Qil
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihlm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T i∗f
(
pihld (t)− pihlm (t)
)
e−rtdt

= Qhl
Ph − ch − γ
r
(1− τh) +Qhl
(X(1− ηQhl )
r − µ
−
(
X
Xn∗f (Q
h
l )
)β1
Xn∗f (Q
h
l )ηQ
n∗
f (Q
h
l )
r − µ
 (1− ρ)− Ph(1− θ)
r
(1− τf) (5.18)
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and after the follower invests, given by:
Πhld
(
X,Qhl
)
= E

∞∫
t=T i∗f
pihld (t) e
−rtdt

= Qhl
Ph − ch − γ
r
(1− τh) +Qhl
X
(
1− η(Qhl +Qnf )
)
r − µ (1− ρ)−
Ph (1− θ)
r
(1− τf)
(5.19)
The value of the leader producing in the home country, after investing, Xn∗f
(
Qhl
)
>
X ≥ Xh∗p , is given by:
V hlm (X) = Π
h
lm
(
X,Qh∗l
)
− δhQh∗l (5.20)
and before investing, as it still holds the option, X < Xh∗p < X
n∗
f
(
Qhl
)
, is:
V0
h
l (X) =
(
Πhlm
(
Xh∗l , Q
h∗
l
)
− δhQh∗l
)(
X
Xh∗l
)β1
(5.21)
where Xh∗p , the leader’s optimal time to invest, and Q
h∗
l , the optimal capacity at the
moment of investment, are obtained by simultaneously solving equations:
V hlm
(
Xh∗p , Q
h∗
l
)
= V0
n
f
(
Xh∗p , Q
h∗
l
)
(5.22)
and
∂V slm
(
X,Qh∗l
)
∂Qh∗l
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗p
= 0 (5.23)
The optimal market price for investing is given by:
P h∗l = X
h∗
l
(
1− ηQh∗l
)
(5.24)
The leader’s case in this Chapter is similar to the leader’s case in the safe envi-
ronment, the only difference being the extra costs that it has to endure. Before the
follower invests, X < Xn∗f , the value of the leader, given by V
h
lm
(X) (5.20), needs
to take into account the drop in value of the cash flows that will take place once
the follower invests. After the follower invest, X ≥ Xn∗f , the value of the leader is
simply its value from being in a duopoly.
5.2 Rules for choosing
To decide what strategy is optimal for firms, to whether produce in there home
country or produce in the foreign country, a rule of investment is in order. Firms, at
the beginning of the process, already known that they have the option to produce in
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their home country or in the foreign country. The best optimal strategy is to choose
the option with the most value the first time that they can observe which option is
more valuable since these two options are mutually exclusive, firms can only decide
to produce in one of two countries. Also, we have to take into consideration that
firms need time to plan the implementation of their investments, and by choosing
the optimal strategy the first time that they can observe which plan is better gives
them more time to plan the investment.
If the foreign country is considered to be safe, in other words, the government
does not intend to expropriate, the optimal strategy is to choose the option with
the higher value between the two:
max
[
V0
s
n, V0
h
n
]
(5.25)
where the subscript n =
{
m, l(p), f
}
represents the monopolist, the leader and the
follower, respectively.
If, on the other hand, the foreign government acts opportunistically, first firms
need to check if the trigger of expropriation is higher than their trigger for invest-
ment, otherwise the intrinsic value of the business would be zero, and their only
choice is to produce in their home county:
max
[
V0
e
n, V0
h
n
]
if Xe∗n < X∗en
V0
h
n if X
e∗
n ≥ X∗en
(5.26)
In the following section, we will only compare the case for producing at home
with the risky foreign scenario, since that is what we are more interest in.
5.3 Numerical Results
The base-case parameter values are: r = 0.06, µ = 0.02, σ = 0.25, cv = 0.4, ch = 0.5,
cg = 0.6, δf = 20, δh = 25, η = 0.05, ρ = 0, τf = 0.15, τh = 0.20, γ = 0.1, φ = 0.1,
θ = 0.15 and k = 0.85. For the competitive case k = 0.90 is used.
5.3.1 Monopoly
Given the base-case parameter, that assumes that the costs in the foreign country
are lower than in the home country, the first thing that a firm needs to do in order
to identify the optimal choice of place for production, is to check which option
that it holds, to produce in the home country or in the foreign country, has the
highest value. In Figure 5.1a, point ”A” marks the last value of k for which the
value of the option to produce in the home country, V0
h
m, equals the value of the
option to produce in the risky foreign country, V0
e
m. At this point, the monopolist
is indifferent between producing in the home or the foreign country. Note that this
representation does not mean that the government can change its k at will in order
to attract investment. The k parameter is set at the beginning of the process and
does not change, the graph only shows all the possible results.
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Because, for our base case of k = 0.85, the value of the option to produce in
the home country has a higher value, so the monopolist will choose to produce in
its home country to then export and sell in the foreign country, even though with
higher and extra costs. From Figure 5.1b we can see that since that is the case, the
initial market price will be higher, given by P h∗m instead of P
e∗
m , the trigger price to
produce in the home country and the trigger price to produce in the foreign country,
respectively. The higher initial price is to compensate for the extra costs that the
monopolist has to endure for producing at home. Because the compensation for
expropriation is not sufficiently high, the best strategy for the monopolist is to
produce at home at a higher cost which is reflected in the price. Point ”A” in
Figure 5.1b shows the drop in the initial price (trigger price) that occurs when the
monopolist decides to produce in the foreign country, when V0
e
m > V0
h
m.
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Taking now a market perspective of our base-case, looking at Figure 5.2a, we
can see that if the monopolist were to produce in the foreign country, it would
invest sooner, Xe∗m , at a lower price, P
e∗
m , when compared with producing in the
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home country, where it invests later, Xh∗m , and at a higher price, P
h∗
m . Because the
monopolist will produce in its home country and thus invests later, the market will
be deprived of the potential product for longer (Figure 5.2b).
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Looking now at the amount of compensation that the government must pay to
make V0
e
m = V0
h
m, for different parameter values (Figure 5.3), we can see from Figure
5.3a that as σ increases the amount of compensation must also increase. This result
highlights the limitation that the government imposes on the value of the option
to produce (invest) in the foreign country when compared to the option to produce
at home country where there is no risk for expropriation. Because there is no risk
for expropriation in the home country, as the volatility of the market increases the
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value of the option to produce in the home country is free to capture all the extra
value that comes from the possibility for higher cash-flows, while the value of the
option to produce in the foreign country is always limited by the existence of a
government whiling to expropriate the firm. The markup factor, φ, does not seem
to have much importance, given the base-case scenario. For higher values of φ the
government will be able to pay slightly less compensation in order for the monopolist
to invest in the foreign country, which can be explained by the double role that φ
takes in the transfer price, that is both considered as revenue, in the home country,
and as a cost, in the foreign country. In the case of the tariff tax θ, the story is
different since it only affects negatively the value of the option to produce in the
home country. Because θ reduces the value of the option to produce in the home
country, the compensation that the government has to pay to ensure investment in
the foreign country decreases.
For the parameter µ (Figure 5.3b) the explanation for the results is similar to
the parameter σ. Higher market growth increases the value of both options, but
because the option to produce in the foreign country is limited by the existence of a
government that will expropriate, the value of the option to produce at home grows
faster. With respect to r we have that as it sufficiently small and decreases, it has
the same effect as µ increasing, but for increasing and sufficiently high values o r the
amount of compensation needed for the monopolist to invest in the foreign country
decreases.
Higher corporate tax in the home country decrease the value of the option to
produce in the home country and so the amount of compensation to make both
options equal decreases. For vales of the tax ρ we have a similar story as we saw
in previous chapters. Higher values of ρ only make the private firm wait for higher
real prices in both situations (Figure 5.3c).
Turning now the production costs, ch, transportation costs, γ, and investment
costs, δh, in the home country we can see that as they increase, and thus as the value
of the option to produce in the home country decreases, as expected, the amount
of compensation needed decreases (Figure 5.3d and 5.3e). For the production costs
in the foreign country, cv, and the governments production costs, cg, we need to
take into consideration that both contribute to the value of the option to produce
in the foreign country that the monopolist holds, and thus their variations can
have a higher impact in the value of the option. If the government’s efficiency is
comparable to the private firm, it will need to pay more for expropriation. As its
efficiency decreases, it will not be required to pay as much (Figure 5.3d). We also
have that as the investment costs in the foreign country, δf , increase the amount of
compensation also needs to increase to offset the loss in value of the option.
5.3.2 Competitive
For the competitive case we have to consider that if the compensation is not higher
than 89, 53%, and is optimal for the first firm to produce in the foreign country, the
market will be composed of a single firm, since if a second one wanted to invest, it
would be always competing with the government, since by the time it was optimal
for it to invest the government would already expropriate the first firm and would
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be in the market. If it is optimal for the first firm to produce in the home country,
since firms are symmetric, it will also be optimal for the second firm to produce in
the home country.
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By assuming k = 90%, from Figure 5.4a we can see that both firms will choose to
produce in the foreign country, since the value of the respective options to produce
in the foreign country, V0
e
l and V0
e
f , have a higher value than the options to produce
at home, V0
h
l and V0
h
f . Point ”A” in Figure 5.4a marks the moment when the value of
the option to produce in the home country equals the value of the option to produce
in the foreign country, for both leader and follower.
Figure 5.4b demonstrated the drop in price, similar to the monopolist case, that
occurs when firms decide to produce in the foreign country instead of the home
country. Point ”A” shows the drop in price from the perspective of the leader and
point ”B” from the perspective of the follower. We can see that the drop in price
tends to be larger for the case of the follower when compared to the leader.
For different parameter values, the intuition that we get about the amount of
compensation that makes V0
h
l = V0
e
l , point ”A” in Figure 5.4a, is the same as in the
the monopolist case that we seen in Figure 5.3.
If we look at the market as a whole, we can see from Figure 5.5 that the market
will be explored sooner and that the price will tend to be lower for longer if firms
decide to invest in the country where the market is located. In other words, if a
country wants to attract investment, so it gets lower prices and faster investments,
its government needs to signal to private firms that the compensation that it gives
for expropriation is sufficiently high that firms will be better of by choosing to invest
in the foreign country.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of the market price, in a competitive setting, from producing
at home, P hc , or in the risky country, P
e
c , and the respective quantity’s, Q
h
c and Q
e
c
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to model the effect of the amount of compensation that
governments pay as compensation for expropriation in the investment decision of
private firms, assuming that the government is an opportunistic agent that will
expropriate private investments if it benefits from it.
In a monopolistic context the model shows that if the amount of compensation
at expropriation is lower than the fair value of the monopolistic firm, the monopolist
will tend to invest sooner but with the same installed capacity as if there was no
expropriation risk. This means that the monopolist, knowing that the government
will expropriate at a given market price, will try to invest sooner in a market where
the demand for the product/service is yet to be optimal, so the market prices are
low enough to create a larger margin between the price at investment and the expro-
priation price level. As the compensation approaches the fair value of the business,
the investment strategy of the monopolist tends to its safe case.
For the competitive setting, assuming that firms don’t want to compete with
the government in the marketplace, since this government is thought to be non con-
formists it traditional fair competition arrangements between government-owned
enterprises and privately owned enterprises, we have that the amount of compensa-
tion that the government needs to pay to ensure a competitive market is higher than
for the monopolistic case. For the case that government does compensate enough
private firms that a competitive market is formed, we have that the first private firm
to invest (leader) will be tempted to invest later and with more quantity at a higher
price, and the second firm (follower) will invest sooner and with lower capacity at a
lower price, than the respective safe cases.
When we consider the possibility of private firms producing in their home coun-
try, where there is no expropriation risk but cost of production are higher, so they
can avoid the risk of expropriation in the foreign country, we conclude that if firms
decide to produce in their home country, the market price that they will demand to
invest is bigger than they if they decided to produce in the foreign country where the
market is located. In a safe environment firms will generally opt to produce where
costs are kept at a minimum, but since smaller than fair value compensation can
be seen as a cost for the private firm, the ”real” costs for producing in the foreign
country might just be too big.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The value of the cash flows accruing to the safe monopolist,
at time t, after investing are given by equation (3.6), and since the the expected
value of the investment costs at the moment of investment are the investment costs
themselves, we get that the expected value of the firm at the moment of investment
is given by:
V sm
(
X,Qsm
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pism (t) e
−rtdt− δQsm
 = Πsm (X,Qsm)− δQsm (A.1)
Maximizing with respect to Qsm yields the optimal capacity choice for every given
level of X,
Qs∗m (X) =
1
2η
(
1− (r − µ) (cv − cvτ + rδ)
rX (ρ− 1) (τ − 1)
)
(A.2)
Following standard real options technics 1 we get the value of the option to invest,
noted by V s0m, by solving the the following ordinary differential equation (ode):
1
2
σ2X2
d2V s0m (X)
dX2
+ µX
dV s0m (X)
dX
− rV s0m (X) = 0 (A.3)
The solution for this ode is given by:
A1X
β1 +A1X
β2 (A.4)
where
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(A.5)
is the positive root and
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(A.6)
1Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
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is the negative root of the quadratic:
1
2
σ2β2 +
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
β − r = 0 (A.7)
Since we are talking about an investment option, we know that a natural bound-
ary condition exists when X → 0. When X → 0 the value of the cash-flows go to
zero so we have to make the value of the option be in line with this fact. And so,
the term A2X
β2 must be dropped off since as X → 0, because β2 < 0, A2Xβ2 →∞,
and the value of the option would go to infinity at the same time the value of the
cash flow disappear, not making much economical sense. And so we have that the
solution for the investment option is given by:
V s0m (X) = A1X
β1 (A.8)
Substitution of (A.2) into (A.1) and solving, with respect to Xs∗m , the smooth
pasting (A.10) and value matching (A.9) conditions:
V s0m
(
Xs∗m
)
= V sm
(
Xs∗m , Q
s∗
m(X
s∗
m )
)
(A.9)
δV s0m (X)
δX
∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗m
=
δV sm
(
X,Qs∗m(X)
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗m
(A.10)
yields the value of the option to invest (3.9) and optimal time (trigger), given
the optimal capacity, for investment for the safe monopolist:
Xs∗m =
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)(cv(1− τ) + rδ)
r(1− ρ)(1− τ) (A.11)
Substitution of (A.11) into (A.2) gives (3.11)
Proof of Proposition 2. The value of the cash flows accruing to the passive govern-
ment, at time t, in a monopolistic context, after the monopolist invests, are given
by equation (3.14), and since the government doesn’t have investment costs, only
collects taxes, its expected value at the moment the safe monopolist invests, noted
by Gsm(X,Q
s
m) is the same as the expected value of its cash-flows:
Gsm
(
X,Qsm
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pisgm(t)e
−rtdt
 = Πsgm (X,Qsm) (A.12)
Substitution of (3.11), the safe monopolist optimal quantity, into (A.12) gives
(A.13), the value of the government taking into consideration the quantity in the
market:
Gsm (X) ≡ Gsm
(
X,Qs∗m
)
(A.13)
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For the value of the governments claim on the option of the monopolist, there’s
only need for one value matching condition (A.14) that states that the government
claim on the investment option of the safe monopolist is equal to its claim on the
operating business at the investment trigger Xs∗m :
G0
s
m
(
Xs∗m
)
= Gsm
(
Xs∗m
)
(A.14)
From (A.14) we get (3.17)
Proof of Proposition 3. The value of the cash flows accruing to the safe follower, at
time t, after investing are given by equation (3.18) and since the expected value of
the investment costs at the moment of investment are simply the investment costs
themselves, we get that the expected value of the safe follower at the moment of
investment is given by:
V sf
(
X,Qsl , Q
s
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pisf (t) e
−rtdt− δQsf
 = Πsf (X,Qsl , Qsf)− δQsf (A.15)
Maximizing with respect to Qsf yields the optimal capacity choice for every given
level of X,
Qs∗f
(
X,Qsl
)
=
1
2η
(
1− ηQsl −
(r − µ)(cv + rδ − cvτ)
rX(ρ− 1)(τ − 1)
)
(A.16)
By substituting (A.16) into (A.15) we have:
V sf
(
X,Qsl
) ≡ V sf (X,Qsl , Qs∗f (X,Qsl )) (A.17)
Solving, the smooth pasting (A.18) and value matching (A.19) conditions:
V s0f
(
Xs∗f , Q
s
l
)
= V sf
(
Xs∗f , Q
s
l
)
(A.18)
δV s0f
(
X,Qsl
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗f
=
δV sf
(
X,Qsl
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗f
(A.19)
yields the value of the option to invest (3.21) and the optimal time (trigger), given
the optimal capacity, for investment for the safe follower:
Xs∗f
(
Qsl
)
=
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cv (1− τ) + rδ)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− ηQsl )
(A.20)
Substitution of (A.20) into (A.16) gives (3.23).
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Proof of Proposition 4. The cash flows accruing to the safe leader, at time t, after
investing and while monopolist, are given by equation (3.25), but because the fol-
lower will eventually enter the market, the the cash-flows in duopoly will need to
take into consideration the extra quantity in the market, given by equation (3.26).
Since that is the case, the expected value of the leader at the moment of investment
needs to take into consideration that the follower will enter the market and that the
value of the cash-flows will reduce. We get that the expected value of the safe leader
at the moment of investment is given by:
V slm
(
X,Qsl
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piilm (t) e
−rtdt− δQsl
+ E

∞∫
T i∗f
(
piild (t)− piilm (t)
)
e−rtdt

=
(
QslX(1− ηQsl )
r − µ (1− ρ)−
cvQ
s
l
r
)
(1− τ)
− X
s∗
f (Q
s
l )ηQ
s
f (Q
s
l )Q
s
l (ρ− 1)(τ − 1)
r − µ E
[
e−rT
e∗
f
]
− δQsl (A.21)
Where 2:
E
[
e−rT
s∗
f
]
=
(
X
Xs∗f (Q
s
l )
)β1
(A.22)
and T s∗f is the expected first time when the stochastic process of demand reaches
Xs∗f (Q
s
l ), the trigger of the follower. Substituting (A.22) into (A.21), and rearranging
we get:
V slm
(
X,Qsl
)
= Πslm
(
X,Qsl
)− δQsl (A.23)
To find the optimal time to invest, Xs∗p , and the optimal capacity at the moment
of investment, Qs∗l , equations (A.24) and (A.25) need to be simultaneous solved
numerically.
V slm
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)
= V0
s
f
(
Xs∗p , Q
s∗
l
)
(A.24)
∂V slm
(
X,Qs∗l
)
∂Qs∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xs∗p
= 0 (A.25)
Equation (A.24) states that the leader’s optimal time to invest, Xs∗p , considering
that firms are symmetric and that there exists monopolistic rents, is when its value
equals the option value of the follower. Equation (A.25) simply states that at that
moment the leader will optimally choose its installed capacity Qs∗l .
2Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
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Proof of Proposition 5. The the cash-flows accruing to the passive government from
the follower, at time t, are given by equation (3.41), and since the government
doesn’t have investment costs, only collects taxes, its expected value at the moment
the safe follower invests, noted by Gsf (X,Q
s
l , Q
s
f ), is the same as the expected value
of its cash-flows:
Gsf
(
X,Qsl , Q
s
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pisgf (t)e
−rtdt
 = Πsgf (X,Qsl , Qsf) (A.26)
Substitution of Qs∗f
(
Qsl
)
(3.23), the safe follower optimal quantity, and Qs∗l the
safe leader optimal quantity obtained in (3.32), into (A.26) gives (A.27), the value
of the government taking into consideration the quantity in the market:
Gsf (X) ≡ Gsf
(
X,Qs∗l , Q
s∗
f (Q
s∗
l )
)
(A.27)
For the value of the governments claim on the option of the follower, there’s only
need for one value matching condition (A.28) that states that the government claim
on the investment option of the safe follower is equal to its claim on the operating
business at the investment trigger Xs∗f :
G0
s
f (X
s∗
f ) = G
s
f (X
s∗
f ) (A.28)
From (A.28) we get (3.44).
The cash flows accruing to the passive government from the taxes collected from
the leader, at time t, after the leader invests, and before the follower invests, are
given by equation (3.34), but because the follower will eventually enter the market,
the cash-flows from the taxes collected from the leader in duopoly will need to take
into consideration the extra quantity in the market, given by equation (3.35). Since
that is the case, the expected value of the government, from the taxes from the
leader, at the moment the leader invests need to take into consideration that the
follower will enter the market and that the value of the cash-flows from the leader
will reduce. We get that the expected value of the government at the moment the
leader invests is given by:
Gslm
(
X,Xsf , Q
s
l , Q
s
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
piiglm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T i∗f
(
piigld
(t)− piiglm (t)
)
e−rtdt

=
(
QslX(1− ηQsl )
r − µ − E
[
e−rT
s∗
f
] XsfηQsfQsl
r − µ
)
ρ
+
(QslX(1− ηQsl )
r − µ − E
[
e−rT
s∗
f
] XsfηQsfQsl
r − µ
)
(1− ρ)− cvQ
s
l
r
 τ
(A.29)
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Substituting (A.22), (A.20), (3.23) and the result from (3.32) into (A.29), and
rearranging we get:
Gslm (X) = Π
s
glm
(
X,Qs∗l
)
(A.30)
For the value of the governments claim on the option of the leader, there’s only
need for one value matching condition (A.31) that states that the government claim
on the investment option of the safe leader is equal to its claim on the operating
business at the investment trigger Xs∗l :
G0
s
l (X
s∗
l ) = G
s
lm(X
s∗
l ) (A.31)
From (A.31) we get (3.40).
Proof of Proposition 6. The cash flows accruing to the government, at time t, from
operating the monopolist’s business are given by equation (4.1). When the govern-
ment expropriates the monopolist’s business it pays a compensation relative to the
value of the cash-flows that the monopolist would otherwise collect. We get that
the expected value of the government at the moment it expropriates the monopolist
is given by:
Gem(X,Q
e
m) = E
 ∞∫
t=0
(
piem (t)− kpiem (t)
)
e−rtdt

= Πem
(
X,Qem
)− kΠem (X,Qem)
(A.32)
We get the value of the option to expropriate by solving the the following ordinary
differential equation (ode):
1
2
σ2X2
d2Gem(X,Q
e
m)
dX2
+ µX
dGem(X,Q
e
m)
dX
− rGem(X,Qem) + piegm = 0 (A.33)
The solution for this ode, and thus the value of the option to expropriate, con-
sidering it can be treated as an option to invest, is given by:
Gem(X,Q
e
m) = AX
β1 + Πegm
(
X,Qem
)
(A.34)
By solving the smooth pasting (A.36) and and value matching condition (A.35)
for X∗em :
Gem(X
∗
em , Q
e
m) = Gem(X
∗
em , Q
e
m) (A.35)
δGem(X,Q
e
m)
δX
∣∣∣∣
X=X∗em
=
δGem(X,Q
e
m)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗em
(A.36)
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we get the value of the government before expropriation (4.4) and the government’s
trigger to expropriate the monopolist:
X∗em
(
Qem
)
=
β1
(β1 − 1)
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k) (Qemη − 1)
(A.37)
Proof of Proposition 7. The cash flows accruing to the risky monopolist, at time t,
after investing are given by equation (3.6), but because the monopolist knows that
eventually he will be expropriated, this cash-flows will eventually expire at the mo-
ment of expropriation. At expropriation the monopolist receives for compensation
a fraction k of the present value of the cash-flows, as if it were to continue operation
at that moment. We get that the expected value of the firm at the moment of
investment is given by:
V em
(
X,Qem
)
= E

T ∗em∫
t=0
piem (t) e
−rtdt− δQem
+ kΠem (X∗em (Qem) , Qem)E [e−rT ∗em]
= Πem
(
X,Qem
)1−( X
X∗em(Qem)
)β1−1+kΠem (X∗em(Qem), Qem)
(
X
X∗em(Qem)
)β1
−δQem
(A.38)
where, following Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
(
1−
(
X
X∗em (Q
e
l )
)β1−1)
stands for the
stochastic discount factor that corrects the present value of the cash-flows with
expiration T ∗em , the expected time when the stochastic process of demand reaches
X∗em , the trigger for expropriation.
The solution for the value of the risky monopolist’s investment option, similar
to what was seen before, is given by:
V0
e
m
(
X,Qel
)
= AXβ1 (A.39)
Solving the value matching condition (A.40):
V0
e
m
(
Xe∗m , Q
e∗
l
)
= V em
(
Xe∗m , Q
e∗
l
)
(A.40)
gives us the value of the option to invest (4.9), and by numerically solving the
smooth pasting (A.41) and the capacity optimization (A.42) conditions simultane-
ously, for X∗em :
δV e0m
(
X,Qe∗l
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
=
δV em
(
X,Qe∗l
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
(A.41)
δV em
(
X,Qe∗l
)
δQe∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗m
= 0 (A.42)
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we get the trigger of the risky monopolist, Xe∗m and the optimal capacity at the
moment of investment, Qe∗m
Proof of Proposition 8. The cash flows accruing to the government, at time t, from
operating the follower’s business are given by equation (4.13). When the government
expropriates the follower’s business it pays a compensation relative to the value of
the cash-flows that the follower would otherwise collect. We get that the expected
value of the government at the moment it expropriates the monopolist is given by:
Gef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e
f ) = E
 ∞∫
t=0
(
pief (t)− kpief (t)
)
e−rtdt

= Πef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
− kΠef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
) (A.43)
Similar to the case of the monopolist, the value of the option to expropriate the
follower is given by:
Gef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e
f ) = AX
β1 + Πegf
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
(A.44)
By solving the smooth pasting (A.45) and and value matching condition (A.46)
for X∗ef :
Gef (X
∗
ef
, Qel , Q
e
f ) = Gef (X
∗
ef
, Qel , Q
e
f ) (A.45)
δGef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e
f )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗ef
=
δGef (X,Q
e
l , Q
e
f )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗ef
(A.46)
we get the value of the government before expropriation (4.16) and the government’s
trigger to expropriate the follower:
X∗ef
(
Qel , Q
e
f
)
=
β1
(β1 − 1)
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k)
(
(Qel +Q
e
f )η − 1
) (A.47)
Proof of Proposition 9. The cash flows accruing to the risky follower, at time t, after
investing are given by equation (3.18), but because the follower knows that even-
tually he will be expropriated, this cash-flows will eventually expire at the moment
of expropriation. At expropriation the follower receives for compensation a fraction
k of the present value of the cash-flows, as if it were to continue operation at that
moment. We get that the expected value of the firm at the moment of investment
is given by:
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V ef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
= E

T ∗ef∫
t=0
pief (t) e
−rtdt− δQef
+ kΠef (X∗ef (Qel , Qef ), Qel , Qef)E [e−rT ∗ef ]
= Πef
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)1−( X
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f )
)β1−1
+ kΠef
(
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f ), Q
e
l , Q
e
f
)( X
X∗ef (Q
e
l , Q
e
f )
)β1
− δQef
(A.48)
where the first stochastic discount factor corrects the present value of the cash-
flows with expiration T ∗ef , the expected time when the stochastic process of demand
reaches X∗ef , the trigger for expropriation.
The solution for the value of the risky follower’s investment option, is given by:
V0
e
f
(
X,Qel , Q
e
f
)
= AXβ1 (A.49)
Solving the value matching condition (A.50):
V0
e
f
(
Xe∗f , Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f
)
= V ef
(
Xe∗f , Q
e
l , Q
e∗
f
)
(A.50)
gives us the value of the option to invest (4.21), and by numerically solving the
smooth pasting (A.51) and the capacity optimization (A.52) conditions simultane-
ously, for Xe∗f :
δV0
e
f
(
X,Qel , Q
e∗
f
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
=
δV ef
(
X,Qel , Q
e∗
f
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
(A.51)
δV ef
(
X,Qel , Q
e∗
f
)
δQe∗f
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗f
= 0 (A.52)
we get the trigger of the risky follower, Xe∗f (Q
e
l ) and the optimal capacity at the
moment of investment, Qe∗f (Q
e
l )
Proof of Proposition 10. For values of X∗elm < X
e∗
f
The cash flows accruing to the government, at time t, from operating the leader’s
business, while monopolist, are given by equation (4.25), but because the follower
will eventually will enter the market, the the cash-flows in duopoly will need to take
into consideration the extra quantity in the market, given by equation (4.26). When
the government expropriates the leader’s business it pays a compensation relative
to the value of the cash-flows that the leader would otherwise collect, accounting
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for the loss of value that would occur once the follower invested. We get that the
expected value of the government at the moment it expropriates the leader is given
by:
Gelm (X,Q
e
l ) = E
 ∞∫
t=0
pielm (t) e
−rtdt
+ E

∞∫
T e∗f
pield (t) e
−rtdt
− kΠelm (X,Qel )
= Πelm
(
X,Qel
)− kΠe
lm
(
X,Qel
) (A.53)
The value of the option to expropriate the leader, while monopolist, is given by:
Ge
lm
(X,Qel ) = AX
β1 + Πeglm
(
X,Qel
)
(A.54)
By numerically solving the smooth pasting (A.56) and the value matching con-
dition (A.55) for X∗elm :
Ge
lm
(X∗elm , Q
e
l ) = Gelm (X
∗
elm
, Qel ) (A.55)
δGelm(X,Q
e
l )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗elm
=
δGelm (X,Q
e
l )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗elm
(A.56)
we get the value of the government before expropriation (4.34) and the govern-
ment’s trigger to expropriate the leader while monopolist, X∗elm (Q
e
l ), taking in to
consideration that we still need to find the leaders optimal quantity.
For values of X∗elm > X
e∗
f
The cash flows accruing to the government, at time t, from operating the leader’s
business, while in a duopoly, are given by equation (4.26). When the government
expropriates the leader’s business it pays a compensation relative to the value of
the cash-flows that the leader would otherwise collect in a duopoly. We get that the
expected value of the government at the moment it expropriates the leader is given
by:
Geld (X,Q
e
l ) = E
 ∞∫
t=0
pield (t) e
−rtdt
− kΠeld (X,Qel ) = Πeld (X,Qel )− kΠeld (X,Qel )
(A.57)
The value of the option to expropriate the leader in a duopoly is given by:
Geld(X,Q
e
l ) = AX
β1 + Πegld
(
X,Qel
)
(A.58)
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By solving the smooth pasting (A.60) and the value matching condition (A.59)
for X∗eld :
Geld(X
∗
eld
, Qel ) = Geld (X
∗
eld
, Qel ) (A.59)
δGeld(X,Q
e
l )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗eld
=
δGeld (X,Q
e
l )
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=X∗eld
(A.60)
we get the value of the government before expropriation (4.34) and the government’s
trigger to expropriate the leader while in a duopoly:
X∗eld
(
Qel
)
=
β1
β1 − 1
(r − µ) (cvk + cv (1− k) τ − cg)
r (1− ρ) (1− τ) (1− k)
(
(Qel +Q
e∗
f (Q
e
l ))η − 1
) (A.61)
Proof of Proposition 11. For values of X∗elm < X
e∗
f
The cash flows accruing to the risky leader while in monopolist, at time t, after
investing are given by equation (3.25), and since the leader will eventually be expro-
priated, even before the follower invests, this cash-flows will expire at the moment
of expropriation. At expropriation the leader receives for compensation a percent-
age k of the present value of the cash-flows, as if it were to continue operations at
that moment, which means that the compensation will take into consideration the
corrections for the eventual entrance of the follower in the market. We get that the
expected value of the firm at the moment of investment is given by:
V elm
(
X,Qel
)
= E

T ∗elm∫
t=0
pielm (t) e
−rtdt− δQel
+ kΠelm (X,Qel )E [e−rT ∗elm ]
= Πem
(
X,Qel
)1−( X
X∗elm (Q
e
l )
)β1−1+ kΠelm (X,Qel )
(
X
X∗elm (Q
e
l )
)β1
− δQel (A.62)
where the first stochastic discount factor corrects the present value of the cash-
flows with expiration T ∗elm , the expected time when the stochastic process of demand
reaches X∗elm , the trigger for expropriation.
For values of X∗elm > X
e∗
f
The cash flows accruing to the risky leader while in duopoly, at time t, after
investment are given by equation (3.26), and since the leader will be expropriated
after the follower invests, we have this cash-flows will expire at the moment of
expropriation. At expropriation the leader receives for compensation a percentage
k of the present value of the cash-flows as if it were to continue operations in a
duopoly. We get that the expected value of the firm at the moment of follower
invest is given by:
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V eld
(
X,Qel
)
= E

T ∗eld∫
t=0
pield (t) e
−rtdt− δQel
+ kΠeld (X,Qel )E
[
e
−rT ∗eld
]
= Πeld
(
X,Qel
)1−
 X
X∗eld (Q
e
l )
β1−1
+ kΠeld (X∗eld (Qel ), Qel)
 X
X∗eld (Q
e
l )
β1 − δQel
(A.63)
where the first stochastic discount factor corrects the present value of the cash-
flows with expiration T ∗eld , the expected time when the stochastic process of demand
reaches X∗eld , the trigger for expropriation.
Before the follower invests, the value of the leader is the value of the cash-flows
from being a monopolist in the market plus the the value of an option, that once
exercised by the follower, will make him lose its monopolist rents and transform the
market into a duopoly. The value of the leader before the follower invests is given
by:
V elm
(
X,Qel
)
= Πem
(
X,Qel
)
+AXβ1 − δQel (A.64)
where by applying the necessary value matching condition:
V elm
(
Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, Qel
)
= V eld
(
Xe∗f
(
Qel
)
, Qel
)
(A.65)
we get:
A =
Πeld (Xe∗f (Qel ) , Qel)
1−
Xe∗f (Qel )
X∗eld (Q
e
l )
β1−1

+kΠeld
(
X∗eld (Q
e
l ), Q
e
l
)Xe∗f (Qel )
X∗eld (Q
e
l )
β1 −Πem (Xe∗f (Qel ), Qel)
( 1
Xe∗f (Q
e
l )
)β1
(A.66)
Substitution of (A.66) into (A.64) gives (4.44).
For both cases:
Considering that firms are symmetric, and in both cases there is monopolistic
rents, we get the leader’s trigger for investment, Xe∗p , and its optimal capacity at
the moment of investment, Qe∗l , by numerically solving the value matching condition
(A.67) and the capacity optimization condition (A.68) simultaneously, for Xe∗p :
V elm
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
= V0
e
f
(
Xe∗p , Q
e∗
l
)
(A.67)
δV elm
(
X,Qel
)
δQe∗l
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xe∗p
= 0 (A.68)
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Proof of Proposition 12. The value of the cash flows accruing to the monopolist
producing in its home country, at time t, after investing are given by equation (5.2),
and since the the expected value of the investment costs at the moment of investment
are the investment costs themselves, we get that the expected value of the firm at
the moment of investment is given by:
V hm
(
X,Qhm
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihm (t) e
−rtdt− δQhm
 = Πhm (X,Qhm)− δQhm (A.69)
Maximizing with respect to Qhm yields the optimal capacity choice for every given
level of X,
Qh∗m (X) =
1
2η
1− (r − µ)
(
ch + rδh + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
rX (ρ− 1) (τf − 1)

(A.70)
The solution for the investment option is given by:
V h0m (X) = AX
β1 (A.71)
Substitution of (A.70) into (A.69) and solving, with respect to Xh∗m , the smooth
pasting (A.73) and value matching (A.72) conditions:
V s0m
(
Xh∗m
)
= V sm
(
Xh∗m , Q
h∗
m (X
h∗
m )
)
(A.72)
δV h0m (X)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗m
=
δV hm
(
X,Qh∗m (X)
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗m
(A.73)
yields the value of the option to invest (5.5) and the optimal time (trigger), given
the optimal capacity, for investment for the monopolist producing at home:
Xh∗m =
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)
(
ch + rδh + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
r (1− ρ) (1− τf) (A.74)
Substitution of (A.74) into (A.70) gives (5.7)
Proof of Proposition 13. The value of the cash flows accruing to the follower pro-
ducing in its home country, at time t, after investing are given by equation (5.9)
and since the expected value of the investment costs at the moment of investment
are simply the investment costs themselves, we get that the expected value of the
safe follower at the moment of investment is given by:
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V hf
(
X,Qnl , Q
h
f
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihf (t) e
−rtdt− δQhf
 = Πhf (X,Qnl , Qhf)− δQhf (A.75)
Maximizing with respect to Qhf yields the optimal capacity choice for every given
level of X,
Qh∗f
(
X,Qnl
)
=
1
2η
1− ηQnl − (r − µ)
(
ch + rδh + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
rX (ρ− 1) (τf − 1)

(A.76)
By substituting (A.76) into (A.75) we have:
V hf
(
X,Qnl
) ≡ V hf (X,Qnl , Qh∗f (X,Qnl )) (A.77)
Solving, the smooth pasting (A.79) and value matching (A.78) conditions:
V h0f
(
Xh∗f , Q
n
l
)
= V hf
(
Xh∗f , Q
n
l
)
(A.78)
δV h0f
(
X,Qnl
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗f
=
δV hf
(
X,Qnl
)
δX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗f
(A.79)
yields the value of the option to invest (5.12) and the optimal time (trigger), given
the optimal capacity, for investment for the follower producing at home:
Xh∗f
(
Qnl
)
=
β1 + 1
β1 − 1
(r − µ)
(
ch + rδ + γ − (ch + γ)τh +
(
θ(1− τf )− τf + τh
)
Ph
)
r(1− ρ)(1− τf )(1−Qnl )
(A.80)
Substitution of (A.80) into (A.76) gives (5.14).
Proof of Proposition 14. The cash flows accruing to the leader producing at home,
at time t, after investing and while monopolist, are given by equation (5.16), but
because the follower will eventually will enter the market, the the cash-flows in
duopoly will need to take into consideration the extra quantity in the market, given
by equation (5.17). Since that is the case, the expected value of the leader at the
moment of investment needs to take into consideration that the follower will enter
the market and that the value of the cash-flows will reduce. We get that the expected
value of the safe leader at the moment of investment is given by:
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V hlm
(
X,Qhl
)
= E
 ∞∫
t=0
pihlm (t) e
−rtdt− δQhl
+ E

∞∫
Tn∗f
(
pihld (t)− pihlm (t)
)
e−rtdt

= Qhl
Ph − ch − γ
r
(1− τh) +Qhl
(X(1− ηQhl )
r − µ
−
(
X
Xn∗f (Q
h
l )
)β1
Xn∗f (Q
h
l )ηQ
n∗
f (Q
h
l )
r − µ
 (1− ρ)− Ph(1− θ)
r
(1− τf)− δhQhl (A.81)
where T n∗f is the expected first time when the stochastic process of demand reaches
Xn∗f (Q
h
l ), the trigger of the follower.
To find the optimal time to invest, Xh∗p , and the optimal capacity at the moment
of investment, Qh∗l , equations (A.82) and (A.83) need to be simultaneous solved
numerically.
V hlm
(
Xh∗p , Q
h∗
l
)
= V0
n
f
(
Xh∗p , Q
h∗
l
)
(A.82)
∂V hlm
(
X,Qh∗l
)
∂Qh∗l
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
X=Xh∗p
= 0 (A.83)
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